The Ohio Supreme Court modified a judgment of the Court of Appeals in a matter involving a claim of attorney-client privilege

The matter involved a public records request of a resident to a law firm that had provided services to two public entities

The Baker firm provided Ames with the invoices, but it redacted the narrative portions on the ground that they contained information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. After the Baker firm refused Ames’s
follow-up request for unredacted invoices, Ames filed his petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, seeking an order directing appellees to produce unredacted invoices. The court of appeals dismissed the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), concluding that although appellees were subject to the Public Records Act notwithstanding their private-party status, the information sought by Ames was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege because it contained descriptions of legal services. Id. at ¶ 5. Ames then appealed to this court.

The court had reversed and remanded, directing an in camera inspection to evaluate the privilege claim

we concluded that the court of appeals had misapplied the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard by presuming that the redacted invoices contained information protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. As we pointed out, Ames had alleged that the redacted invoices attached to his petition did not include privileged information. Id. at ¶ 16-17. By failing to presume the truth of this allegation as required under the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) standard, the court of appeals committed reversible error in granting appellees’ motions to dismiss.

After that review

the court determined that “there are no claims upon which relief can be granted since Mr. Ames received the legal invoices he requested, which were properly redacted under the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at ¶ 15. The court granted appellees’ motions to dismiss Ames’s petition. Ames then filed this appeal.

The court

The key issue in this case is whether the redacted invoices contain information protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. As noted above, they do. And although Ames faults the court of appeals for creating an end run “around summary judgment by accepting evidence and argument from one side while excluding the other,” he does not identify any evidence that he would like to obtain and furnish on remand to support his request for the writ. Without more, Ames has not shown any prejudice resulting from the court of appeals’ error.

Because this court reviews the judgment of a court of appeals in a mandamus action as if it had been originally filed here, we modify the judgment of the court of appeals, which granted appellees’ motions to dismiss Ames’s petition, to instead enter judgment denying the writ. 

(Mike Frisch)