In And Out

An attorney who had consented to disbarment in 2005 and been reinstated in 2007 after a California criminal conviction was reversed, has now been placed on disability inactive status by the Maryland Supreme Court.

The Washington Post had called him a “top dollar” Maryland lobbyist in a 1973 story about a marijuana arrest.

Herald-Mail Media reported in 2021

A well-known Hagerstown attorney was among several people recently charged with general prostitution following a sting in the city.

Ira Charles Cooke, 75, of The Gardens, was charged via summons with general prostitution stemming from the police operation on June 3, according to Washington County District Court documents.

Part of the multi-agency sting involved undercover officers posing as prostitutes in the area of Walnut and Church streets, an area known for prostitution, court records state.

Cooke was in a car when he was approached by an undercover officer and allegedly agreed to pay a price for sex, according to charging documents. He was advised to drive to the rear of a tavern in the 200 block of West Franklin Street to meet up. There, he was stopped by Hagerstown Police.

Cooke, via phone, said Thursday he had no comment.

A general prostitution charge includes knowingly engaging in “prostitution/assignation” by any means, according to charging language at the Maryland Courts website. It is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail and/or a $500 fine.

From the reinstatement order

On or about December 8, 2004, in the Superior Court of California, Kern County, a jury convicted the petitioner and his co-defendant, Bobbie Cumberworth, of criminal conspiracy, grand theft, and commercial bribery. Each was sentenced to five years’ probation, with a conditional one-year jail term suspended. To avoid the one-year jail sentence, the petitioner and his co-defendant were required to pay restitution. People v. Cumberworth, No. F047243, 2006 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 11142 at *1 (Cal.Ct.App. Dec. 11, 2006).

Because neither defendant disputed receiving the payments alleged to constitute the theft and bribery, the contested issues at trial were whether the petitioner’s co-defendant provided services to Desert Counseling Clinic (“DCC”)  the alleged victim of the fraud, and whether they, or either of them, had the specific intent to commit the crimes with which they were charged. As to these issues, the jury was instructed that the defendants could not be found guilty “if they acted in ignorance or in the honest belief that certain facts existed, or if they had a good faith belief that he or she had a right to the money received from DCC.” Id. at *55. To be sure, the State made much of the secrecy with which the transaction was conducted and “the obvious appearance of impropriety produced by the transfer of funds to Cooke and then back to Terence [Cumberworth, the co-defendant’s husband] and Bobbie [Cumberworth, the co-defendant].” Id. But the State also offered evidence, admitted by the court, over the defendants’ objections, of a prior bad act by the petitioner, that his co-defendant asserted both her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and the spousal communications privilege before the Grand Jury, and of misdeeds, committed by the co-defendant’s husband, unrelated to the crimes on trial. The State also was permitted to argue facts not in evidence. The defendants countered, as reported by the intermediate appellate court:

“Both argued that there was no intent to defraud DCC. Cooke emphasized that he earned the money he was paid by DCC, and he believed Bobbie was earning the money he was paying her. Bobbie testified that she performed work for DCC under the direction of her husband, Terence. She accepted the money she was paid because she believed she earned it. Several witnesses testified to Terence’s dynamic personality and his tendency to keep information to himself. This combination led Cooke and Bobbie to believe the arrangement was above board.”

Id. But they were also concerned that certain of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings improperly and unfairly undermined their testimony and their credibility. Their appeal, therefore, challenged the propriety and correctness of these evidentiary rulings.

On appeal

In December 2006, the California Court of Appeal reversed the petitioner’s convictions and those of his co-defendant, citing several evidentiary violations, see Cumberworth, 2006 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 11142 at *2, and, subsequently, the State of California dismissed the case against the two defendants.

Opinion linked here. (Mike Frisch)