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DWI Convictions And Attorney Discipline

The Minnesota Supreme Court has suspended an attorney for a minimum of 30 days for a driving while intoxicated conviction

The court has independently reviewed the file and approves the recommended disposition in part. We agree that respondent should be suspended for a minimum of 30 days. But we modify the recommended terms of respondent’s probation. Respondent could be discharged early from his criminal probation. As modified, respondent’s disciplinary probation will last for the entire length of time that his criminal probation could last, in other words, until February 22, 2028.

MOORE, III, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

Today the court approves in part a stipulation for discipline reached between the Director’s office and respondent Mitchell J. Ask, which arose from Ask’s recent conviction of felony driving while impaired (DWI) in Stearns County. While I concur with the court’s modification of the probationary terms imposed upon Ask, I respectfully dissent from the court’s approval of the parties’ agreement for a 30-day suspension. In my view, Ask’s violation of Minn. R. Prof. Cond. 8.4(b) arises from repetitive dangerous criminal behavior—four convictions for DWI within a 10-year period—that reflects adversely on his fitness as an attorney and injures the reputation of the legal profession. Even though such misconduct may well arise from chronic alcohol abuse or addiction, our disciplinary decision must prioritize public protection when repeat DWI offenses are involved. Because Ask’s continued indifference to the law and public safety endangers the public and undermines the public’s confidence in the legal system and the profession at large, I would suspend Ask for 120 days and require him to petition for reinstatement.

The dissent notes the wide array of disparate sanctions imposed around the country for like offenses and notes

The facts of this alarming case likewise warrant a more stringent response than the court may have tolerated in the past when called upon to discipline attorneys who commit felony DWI offenses. Law enforcement’s attention was drawn to Ask due to a citizen complaint of his vehicle traveling in the wrong lane of the roadway and over the fog line. When he was tested after being stopped, Ask had an alcohol concentration of .28 percent—more than three times the .08 DWI threshold—with an uncased gun in the passenger seat of his vehicle. These facts represent a particular danger to the public that the court should heed and address.

McKEIG, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I join in the concurrence in part and dissent in part of Justice Moore.

(Mike Frisch)