No Tort Liability To Adverse Party

The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a law firm is not liable to an adverse party

Amanda Bryant brought this action against State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and its attorneys, Henley, Lotterhos & Henley, PLLC (HLH), claiming negligence, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on HLH’s actions in a prior subrogation claim. HLH argued in a Motion to Dismiss or, In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment that it was not a proper party to this lawsuit because it was the legal representative of the adverse party in the prior subrogation matter. For this reason, HLH argues it does not owe a duty to Bryant that could give rise to tort liability. The trial court disagreed with HLH and denied its motion.

This Court granted HLH’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Based on caselaw, this Court reverses the trial court’s order and renders judgment in favor of HLH. Because State Farm is still party to the action, the case is remanded to the trial court for continuation of the proceedings.

Presiding Justice King dissented based on review of the plaintiff’s contentions

The majority characterizes these facts as “one mistake” and its consequences. Maj. Op. ¶ 26. Perhaps a jury would agree, but the majority’s generous characterization is not the lens through which we view the evidence on summary judgment. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Bryant, and with that requirement, the evidence does not lend itself to being categorized as a simple mistake. When viewed in the light most favorable to Bryant, HLH, in possession of the accident report, sued State Farm’s own client for a wreck, for which Bryant was not at fault, on behalf of the at-fault party. It sued Bryant in a county it knew she did not live and in which the accident did not occur. Knowing it did not properly serve Bryant and with full knowledge that she was a minor, it continued to pursue the case, sending all correspondence to the incorrect address. Then, when Bryant did call the office pro se, HLH gave her incorrect legal advice. Having received a pro se letter very obviously directed to HLH in which Bryant disputed her own fault and expressed confusion as to the next steps, HLH did nothing. Further, Bryant clearly indicated that HLH directed her to write such a letter to handle the matter, thus allegedly giving a pro se opposing party faulty legal advice. HLH then eliminated the designation of minor on court papers, which, in the light most favorable to Bryant, may have been to mislead the trial court. It further represented to the trial court that Bryant had filed an answer, despite HLH’s knowledge that she had filed nothing. After Bryant learned of the default judgment against her, she alleges that she again called HLH and was advised that her only option to reinstate her license was to set up a payment plan; otherwise, HLH advised, it would keep her license suspended for seven years. When Bryant hired an attorney, HLH attempted to file an answer on Bryant’s behalf, despite the fact that her own attorney could have filed an answer.

Thus, when viewed in the light most favorable to Bryant, the evidence potentially shows that HLH, on behalf of State Farm, filed a meritless lawsuit (against State Farm’s own innocent client to recover money paid on behalf of its at-fault client), filed it in the wrong venue to subvert Bryant’s knowledge of the lawsuit, failed to personally serve Bryant, hid the lack of personal service from the court, misled Bryant, ignored Bryant, and then misled the trial court in order to obtain a default judgment against Bryant. When these facts were brought to light, HLH again gave Bryant misleading legal advice and then attempted to file a pleading on Bryant’s behalf, despite Bryant and her own attorney having no pleadings to file, thus arguably attempting to mislead the clerk into filing something that would then mislead the court. While there are several ways to interpret the evidence, when doing so in the light most favorable to Bryant, HLH’s conduct certainly appears egregious, potentially involving questionable or improper motive. Consequently, I believe we need to squarely address the issue of attorney conduct giving rise to tort liability to an adverse party.