Bar Delay Mitigates Sanction

The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that delay was a mitigating factor in accepted a voluntary petition for a six-month suspension

we conclude that, as to mitigation, Hamilton demonstrated on remand that, during the pertinent time period, she suffered personal hardships and emotional problems that contributed to her delay in paying the fee arbitration award and helped to explain her lack of candor in her initial response in this disciplinary proceeding. And we agree with the Special Master that these mitigating circumstances are outweighed by Hamilton’s prior disciplinary record, which demonstrates a concerning pattern of misconduct over a lengthy period of Hamilton’s career. See In the Matter of Jennings, 305 Ga. 133, 135 (823 SE2d 811) (2019) (attorney’s violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 (d), and 3.2 relating to his failure to return a file in a single matter “show[ed] a pattern of misconduct, [which] support[ed] the sanction of disbarment”). In fact, Hamilton’s significant disciplinary history—largely involving her failure to adequately communicate with clients, her failure to appear at hearings, and her failure to return unearned fees—has been and remains of utmost concern to this Court.

Nevertheless, we observe that the resolution of this matter was significantly delayed by the first Special Master’s unresponsiveness and the State Bar’s oversight in allowing this case to languish for several years—through no fault of Hamilton. And it does not appear from the record that Hamilton has engaged in any professional misconduct since the circumstances giving rise to this disciplinary matter or her reinstatement to the Bar in 2017.

Accordingly, based on the evidence in the record and the particular circumstances of this case—where an unusual delay by the State Bar prevented the timely resolution of this matter—we agree with the Special Master that a six-month suspension is appropriate for Hamilton’s single violation of Rule 1.16 (d)…To be clear, the sanction imposed here should not be relied upon as precedent for the level of discipline we would ordinarily impose in a case with such a litany of misconduct; it is only the result of the substantial delay in this case.

(Mike Frisch)