No Second Reprimand For Immigration Lapses

The Maryland Supreme Court has ordered a 90-day suspension for an attorney’s mishandling of immigration matters

We conclude that the appropriate sanction for Mr. Tabe’s misconduct is a 90-day suspension from the practice of law in Maryland, with conditions upon reinstatement. Mr. Tabe’s argument for a second reprimand is not persuasive because of his substantial experience with the law, prior reprimand for substantially similar misconduct, and the serious negative repercussions of his actions. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 524, 270 A.3d 917, 942 (2022) (“[A] reprimand may be appropriate when, among other reasons, there is no specific intent and the charged attorney is either a neophyte who expeditiously admits to misconduct, or lacks a disciplinary record.”
(Cleaned up)).

The overall circumstances of this case are somewhat similar to those of Moore, 447 Md. at 273-74, 135 A.3d at 401-02, in which we ordered a sanction of indefinite suspension: lack of competence, diligence, and communication in the representation, resulting in negative outcomes for clients in immigration proceedings, with the attorney having previously received a reprimand for similar misconduct and struggling with
personal issues. There are key factual differences, however, that convince us that a lesser sanction is appropriate. Unlike in Moore, id. at 266-67, 135 A.3d at 398, where the attorney “performed virtually no work” in two cases, here, Mr. Tabe provided some of the services he was hired for, but he significantly undercut the usefulness of his work with serious mistakes. Further, Mr. Tabe was fully cooperative with the disciplinary process, unlike the attorney in Moore, id. at 269-70, 135 A.3d at 399-400, who failed to respond to requests from the Commission regarding the complaints filed against him. In addition, although Mr. Tabe surely had lapses in communication, they fell short of those of the attorney in
Moore, id. at 268, 135 A.3d at 398-99, who at times totally failed to communicate with clients.

For similar reasons, Mr. Tabe’s misconduct was less severe than the attorney’s in Taniform, 482 Md. at 306-07, 286 A.3d at 1091-92: Mr. Tabe actually performed work on behalf of his clients and did not mislead them into believing that he had done work that he had not. Most significantly, Mr. Tabe’s conduct did not involve any intentional dishonesty, whereas the attorney in Taniform, id. at 324, 286 A.3d at 1102, made intentional misrepresentations to clients, their representatives, and Bar Counsel. We see a distinction between a lawyer who does essentially no work on behalf of a client and either ignores the client’s requests for updates on a matter or misrepresents that he has done the work (i.e., the attorney in Taniform), and one who performs work requested by the client but undermines it with serious errors (i.e., Mr. Tabe).

Mr. Tabe’s conduct in this case is also less serious than that of the attorney in Riely, 471 Md. at 505, 242 A.3d at 234, primarily because of the lack of intentional dishonesty. Specifically, the attorney in Riely not only misled a client and an immigration official, but also engaged in deceptive practices during the disciplinary process to cover up his mistakes. See id. at 505, 242 A.3d at 234. In contrast, Mr. Tabe was generally candid with his clients and Bar Counsel and owned up to his errors. Mr. Tabe’s efforts on behalf of his clients also differed markedly from those of the attorney in Riely, which were characterized by a failure “to make any meaningful effort to advance the immigration cases[.]” Riely,
471 Md. at 495, 242 A.3d at 228.

For all of these reasons, we suspend Mr. Tabe from the practice of law in Maryland for 90 days with the condition of the engagement of an attorney monitor for a one-year period upon reinstatement to the practice of law in Maryland. The attorney monitor’s responsibilities shall include, but not be limited to, oversight of workload volume and stress management issues.

As in a recent Wisconsin decision, the court here held that rules of the immigration court apply to matter before that tribunal

 In the instant matter, except for the violations of MARPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MARPC), and Maryland Rule 19-404 (Trust Account – Required Deposits) that pertain to trust account violations, the FIRPCP apply to the conduct at issue involving the two immigration cases.

(Mike Frisch)