Most Akin To Disbarment

A Maryland indefinite suspension has resulted in a reciprocal disbarment by the Vermont Supreme Court

The Vermont Rules Governing Establishment and Operation of the Professional Responsibility Program do not provide for an “indefinite suspension.” Instead, suspensions must be “for an appropriate fixed period of time not in excess of three years.” A.O. 9, Rule 15(A)(2); see A.O. 9, Rule 15(A), (A)(2) (providing in relevant part that “[m]isconduct shall be grounds for one or more of the following sanctions: . . . Suspension for an appropriate fixed period of time not in excess of three years”). Attorneys suspended for longer than six months must apply for reinstatement; disbarred attorneys may apply for reinstatement after five years. See A.O. 9, Rule 26(A)-(E). We consider disbarment to be most akin to an “indefinite suspension” under the Maryland Rules, particularly given that no timeline was provided in the Maryland order to allow respondent to apply for reinstatement. Therefore, finding no basis in the record to conclude that the imposition of identical discipline in this State would be unwarranted, an order of disbarment is hereby entered.

The attorney had consented to the Maryland sanction.

With all due respect, an indefinite suspension is not “identical” to disbarment. Arguably, it is “substantially similar” but no more than that.

Note that the District of Columbia, which also does not impose indefinite suspension in original cases and does a huge volume of reciprocal matters, solves this issue with something closer to identical discipline

ORDERED that George H. Spangler is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia subject to a fitness requirement with reinstatement conditioned on either his reinstatement to practice law by the state of Maryland or five years, whichever occurs first

(Mike Frisch)