An Affair To Reprimand

A reprimand has been imposed on a former judge who engaged in an affair with an attorney he appointed to cases and presided in matters without disclosing the relationship.

The Alabama Supreme Court had previously remanded the matter when the Disciplinary Board recommended that both be suspended

Over a period of approximately eight months, Kaminski, while in office as a district-court judge, engaged in an undisclosed affair with Marshall, an attorney who routinely appeared before Kaminski. Both parties were married to other people for at least part of that period. They did not disclose their relationship to litigants, other counsel, or Marshall’s clients. Kaminski, Marshall, and the Bar agree that Kaminski took some judicial actions in cases in which Marshall appeared as counsel of record, but they do not provide any examples of what those actions were, their significance, or their prejudicial or beneficial nature.

The court

No doubt Kaminski and Marshall made a serious mistake; they and their families likely have suffered. Although the Court cannot condone an inappropriate relationship, even between consenting adults, the lack of tangible damage and the existence of compelling mitigating circumstances call for, at most, a public reprimand. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Board and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Shaw dissented from the remand

In sum, I disagree with both Kaminski’s and Marshall’s claims of entitlement to a mere reprimand. Their misconduct, which was admittedly knowingly undertaken, does not amount to the “isolated instance of negligence” contemplated by Standard 5.24 and Standard 4.34, respectively, for imposing a reprimand, nor does it, in my opinion, satisfy the objectives attendant to the supervisory role granted to this Court. See In re Abrams, 227 Ariz. at 254, 255, 257 P.3d at 173, 174 (observing that the offending judge’s “proposal of a reprimand fail[ed] to acknowledge the seriousness of his misconduct and the harm it inflicted on the legal system” and that “[a] reprimand or shorter term of suspension would not adequately address the[] objectives [of restoring the public’s faith in our legal institutions and deterring attorneys from similar misbehavior]”). In my opinion, the spirit and integrity of the legal profession as a whole was damaged as a result of the highly publicized misconduct of Kaminski and Marshall. Based on the foregoing, the Board’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and because a mere reprimand — public or otherwise — is insufficient “to protect the public and the administration of justice,” Preamble, Ala. R. Disc. P., I would affirm the Board’s imposition of terms of suspension for both Kaminski and Marshall.

Two colleagues joined the dissent.

The complaint filed with the Court of the Judiciary is linked here.(Mike Frisch)