Dishonest But How Dishonest?

“Flagrant dishonesty” merits disbarment, according to an opinion issued today by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Associate Judges Easterly and McLeese joined the per curiam decision.

The case involved a number of false statements in a number of situations

In recommending disbarment, the Board concluded that “over the first eight years of her career as an attorney, [Ms. Mayronne] repeatedly engaged in conduct that was dishonest and disingenuous,” violating numerous rules of professional conduct. The Board also found that Ms. Mayronne repeatedly provided explanations for her conduct that “were plainly false.” That included presenting “intentional falsehoods” to the Hearing Committee in her testimony in 2015. The Board explained that disbarment was warranted for “flagrant” dishonesty “reflect[ing] a continuing and pervasive indifference to the obligations of honesty in the judicial system.” In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135, 141 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks  omitted).

Senior Judge Thompson dissented

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court in this case because I believe that disbarment of respondent Mazingo-Mayronne is an “inconsistent disposition[] for comparable conduct” and contravenes the sense of equality that we seek in the sanctions we impose. To be sure, the record in this case reveals repeated instances of dishonesty and other misconduct by respondent Mazingo-Mayronne. I also fully agree with my colleagues that dishonesty by an attorney is always a serious matter. But a comparison of respondent’s dishonest conduct cited by the Hearing Committee and the Board (and detailed below) to the dishonest conduct of attorneys in other cases in which we have imposed a suspensory sanction will, I think, show why I reach a conclusion different from that of my colleagues.

She notes that the hearing committee had proposed a six-month suspension

I cannot agree with my colleagues or the Board that the various instances of respondent’s dishonest conduct (the omission of respondent’s DUI and reckless driving convictions from her application to practice in the federal District Court in Maryland, her representations that she was a non-attorney bankruptcy petition preparer, her false answers on her personal bankruptcy petition, her letterhead implying that she was licensed to practice law in Maryland, and her testimony to the Hearing Committee that her forwarding of the confidential email string to GEICO was the result of “push[ing] the wrong thing”) amount to the type of “persistent, protracted, and extremely serious and flagrant acts of dishonesty” that we have said warrant disbarment.

Rather

Indeed, some of respondent’s misrepresentations at least arguably amounted to sharp practices and less-than-candid responses rather than outright flagrant (meaning, per the dictionary definition, blatant, glaring, or obvious) false statements.

As to a confidentiality violation in forwarding an email string

The possibility that respondent pushed “send” rather than “delete” (to erase the email string) is not inherently incredible; who among us has not unthinkingly forwarded an email string, or received a forwarded string, that would have been better left unforwarded? Without an adverse Hearing Committee credibility determination or finding on this more specific point, I am unable to agree that respondent’s conduct was anywhere near as egregious as the conduct that has caused us to disbar lawyers who have deliberately exposed their clients to loss, recrimination, or criminal prosecution.

Judge Thompson would impose a “substantial suspensory sanction” short of the ultimate one. (Mike Frisch)