Last Rights

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has upheld the rights of deceased to rest in peace, at least pending resolution of issues on remand

The controversy before us comes down to this: may cremated human remains that are buried in a churchyard be disinterred and moved elsewhere against the wishes of the families of the deceased? The trial court judge ruled that, as a matter of law, the church that established the churchyard retained the unilateral right to relocate the remains. As explained below, we conclude that the interred remains retain protection based on principles of contract, property, and trust law. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Locus in quo

In 1961, the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts (diocese) formed a new parish as a legally separate entity known as the Church of the Holy Spirit of Wayland (parish). The parish built a church on a four-acre parcel on Rice Road in Wayland. In 1967, the parish purchased an additional 1.4-acre parcel behind its church. A small portion of that additional land was designated as an area where parishioners could have their cremated remains buried. According to the historical documents included in the record, the area has been described variously as a “burial ground,” a “memorial garden,” and a “churchyard.” The last term appears to be the one most frequently used, and we adopt it for uniformity, except where a different term is used in quotation.

Holding

we now hold that in the absence of a governing statute, common law trust principles apply to the disinterment of human remains from a dedicated burial ground until the families of the deceased have abandoned the remains or the burial ground is no longer recognizable as such. Before turning to the legal ramifications of this, we must address a particular argument that the churches now make that the Legislature has displaced that common law.

Remand

There is little in the record before us that addresses what leaving the remains interred in place would mean as a practical matter for each party.  Relatedly, both sides did little in their respective briefs to address what specific relief would be appropriate going forward if the remains were to stay in place, with the exception that the families included at the end of their brief a list of detailed injunctive terms they desired without ever explaining why they were entitled to such relief.  We recognize that our reversal of the judgment leaves many issues unresolved, such as the parties’ specific rights and obligations with respect to the maintenance of the remaining burial lots and the families’ access to them. This may require not only development of the facts, but also the resolution of at least one nontrivial legal issue.  We leave such issues to the remand.

(Mike Frisch)