A Lawyer Named Lawyer

The North Dakota Supreme Court has affirmed the dismissal of a defamation claim brought by a police officer against an assistant state’s attorney

On February 8, 2017, Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Lawyer received an anonymous letter concerning a Bismarck police officer’s destruction of evidence. Lawyer reviewed the files of all active Bismarck police personnel. Lawyer asserted her decision to review the files was to ensure the state’s attorney’s office was fulfilling its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

As a consequence

During Lawyer’s investigation, she reviewed the file of Sergeant Robyn Krile and concluded Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. On March 22, 2017, Lawyer sent a letter (“Giglio letter”) to Bismarck Police Chief Dan Donlin summarizing her investigation into Krile’s file and stating her belief that Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. Lawyer informed Chief Donlin that such information would have to be disclosed to the defense in cases in which Krile was involved pursuant to Giglio and, as a result, the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office would no longer use Krile as a witness in its cases. The Bismarck Police Department terminated Krile’s employment because the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office was no longer willing to use Krile as a witness.

Lawyer Lawyer filed an affidavit in the former officer’s discrimination complaint and disclosed the letter to another police department.

And got sued

In March 2019, Krile sued Lawyer in her official and individual capacity for defamation. The complaint alleged Lawyer defamed Krile by publishing the Giglio letter to the Bismarck Police Department, specifically Chief Donlin, and by publishing her affidavits to the Department of Labor in the course of its investigation. The complaint also alleged Lawyer defamed Krile by publishing the Giglio letter to the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board and by publishing the Giglio letter and related information to Krile’s prospective employers.

Without actual malice

Krile did not allege any additional facts in support of her conclusory allegation of malice for Lawyer’s communication to Chief Gibbs. We therefore conclude Krile did not make sufficient factual allegations to allege malice. Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Krile and accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, she failed to allege a legally sufficient claim. We conclude the district court did not err by dismissing Krile’s defamation claim related to the publication of the Giglio letter to Chief Gibbs.

(Mike Frisch)