The Law Of Lost Bats

The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in a case involving a lost bat 

On September 12, 2016, Ms. Cornella found a bat in her sons’ bedroom and called the Animal Control Division of the Lander Police Department. Officer Fred Cox responded to the Cornella’s home. He found the bat inside the home, captured it with a net, and put the net in the bed of his pickup truck to transport the bat to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department office so it could be tested for rabies. Shortly thereafter, Officer Cox called Ms. Cornella to let her know that the bat had escaped from the net during transport and could not be tested.

Ms. Cornella reached out to Game and Fish and was told to call the public health office. The public health office referred her to State Veterinarian, Karl Musgraves. Dr. Musgraves told Ms. Cornella that seven bats in the area had recently tested positive for rabies. He advised her to have her sons checked by a doctor for bite marks but cautioned that bat bite marks were not always visible. He recommended that the whole family get rabies vaccines even if they had no visible bite marks.

Plaintiff took her three children to a doctor who found no visible bites but nonetheless recommended treatment for all three

The medical bills for their vaccines totaled $83,007.60.

Summary judgment should not be awarded to defendants

once the court sua sponte changed the dispositive summary judgment issue from “the existence of a duty” to “whether governmental immunity was waived,” W.R.C.P. 56(f)(2) required it to give the parties notice of its intent to rule on that newly identified issue and afford them reasonable time to respond.

Because neither party raised, nor had an opportunity to argue, whether § 15-1-103(a)(l) afforded the City immunity, the district court violated W.R.C.P. 56 when it granted summary judgment on this ground.

And on the negligence claim

Because the undisputed facts of this case show that Officer Cox and Chief Cecrle were peace officers acting within the scope of their duties, see supra ¶¶ 19–22, we conclude that Officer Cox and Chief Cecrle each owed a common law duty to the Cornellas to act as reasonable peace officers under the circumstances. As a result, the City is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and we must reverse the district court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings. The remaining elements of the Cornellas’ negligence claim, and any defenses the City may raise, are questions to be addressed upon remand.

Back to the trial court, same bat-time, same bat-channel. (Mike Frisch)