Hall Pass

An Illinois Hearing Board recommends a year and until further order suspension of an attorney for, among other things, taking advantage of a vulnerable client and continuing the representation after termination

The circumstances we consider, as established by credible evidence, are as follows: by November 13, 2017 Respondent was well-apprised of Anna’s mental limitations and memory problems from sources other than Cohen; despite that knowledge, he accompanied Anna from the Niles facility without meeting with any staff that day and using an earlier dated pass; he had made two previous attempts to take Anna outside the facility; the director of the facility understood he was attempting to collect fees from Anna; after leaving the center with Anna, he did, in fact, receive a check from her for $3,500, which was more than the amount she owed him for fees; he acknowledged having financial difficulties which led to his filing bankruptcy seven months later.

We conclude from the foregoing that Respondent knowingly took advantage of a vulnerable person who was not able to make appropriate decisions for her own welfare. By acting to benefit himself at Anna’s expense, he acted dishonestly in violation of Rule 8.4(c).

Conduct prejudicial

Respondent participated in a litigation matter when he was not authorized to do so, which then triggered a motion for sanctions from his opposing counsel. Further, he filed motions that had no legitimate basis. As a result of his actions and filings, he caused counsel and the court to needlessly expend time and resources to address those matters. We find that his conduct, which undermined the judicial process and furthered no interest of his client, violated Rule 8.4(d).

The board found conflicts violations in an unrelated matter

We find this charge was proved. With respect to Respondent’s preparation of Broomfield’s power of attorney and will, we find there was a significant risk that his legal judgment could be compromised by his own interests in being named to positions which could entitle him to a fee, and which would give him control over Broomfield’s assets and claims against the estate. Such a conflict is not necessarily fatal to a representation, however, if certain conditions under Rule 1.7(b) are met, such as an attorney’s reasonable belief that he could provide competent representation to the client, and his procurement of the client’s informed consent to the representation. We received no evidence that these conditions were met.

With respect to Respondent’s drafting of the letter of promise from Broomfield to Shin, the evidence was not clear which of the two he was representing, but he clearly had represented each of them separately and therefore owed duties to refrain from undertaking a representation of one that would be materially limited by his responsibilities to the other. Respondent presented no evidence that he discussed any conflict with either client or obtained their informed consent.

Use of information from a former client

We find Respondent gained information from his representation of Broomfield relating to Broomfield’s relationship with Shin, including Broomfield’s purchase and financing of a condominium for her, and then used that information to represent Shin’s competing interests against Broomfield’s estate. By his own admission, Respondent had not previously disclosed to the estate his intent to represent Shin in her claim; did not explain the significance or the consequences of that representation to estate representatives; and did not seek the representatives’ consent to represent Shin in her claim against the estate.

(Mike Frisch)