Child Porn And Moral Turpitude: Decision On New BPR Policy Deferred

A decision issued yesterday by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals disbarred a convicted attorney but – because the case was not contested – did not opine on a proposed new procedure adopted below for the more efficient handling of felony convictions

The Board of Professional Responsibility recommends that Thomas Ian Moir be disbarred from the practice of law after pleading guilty to one count of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Although the Board concluded that the crime was not a crime of moral turpitude under the “most benign conduct punishable under the statute” standard, it did conclude that under the facts acknowledged as part of the respondent’s plea his actions constitute a crime of moral turpitude. The Board therefore recommends disbarment. Respondent did not file an exception to the Disciplinary Counsel’s recommendation that he be disbarred for committing a crime of moral turpitude, nor did he file any exceptions to the Board’s Report or Recommendation.

Noting that the Board on Professional Responsibility departed from its prior practice of looking solely to the elements of the offense – not the conceded facts – in determining moral turpitude per se (which requires disbarment), the court concluded here

Because no exceptions have been filed, we need not address the Board’s newly enacted procedures for resolving disciplinary matters based on criminal convictions or reach the issue of whether this offense constitutes a crime of moral turpitude per se or as applied to respondent’s actions, as both support the recommendation of disbarment.

 Footnote to the above sentence

See, e.g., In re Goldsborough, 654 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C. 1995) (imposing recommended discipline while declining to resolve “some difficult questions raised in the Board’s [Report]” where respondent took no part in the proceedings).

The “difficult question” in the Goldsborough case, which involved reciprocal discipline from Maryland, was whether spanking one’s client was conduct prejudicial to the  administration of justice.

The facts of this unusual case are set forth in detail in the opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals, Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d 503 (1993) (Goldsborough I). Briefly, on two separate occasions in 1978, Goldsborough pulled the initial complainant, an adult female client, over his knee, chastised her for being a “bad girl,” and spanked her lightly on the buttocks.

The Maryland opinion further noted

While investigating [client] Sweitzer’s complaint, the Commission’s investigators learned of allegations that Goldsborough had behaved improperly toward at least one other female client, and had also repeatedly spanked a young woman who had been his personal secretary several years earlier.

…[secretary] Schisler testified that during her employment from January 1986 to November 1987, Goldsborough spanked her approximately once a week. By Schisler’s account, on “more than just a handful” of occasions Goldsborough required her to bare her buttocks for the spankings. She testified that these disciplinary measures were provoked by typing errors she made in Goldsborough’s documents and elementary mistakes that Goldsborough called “no brainers.” Schisler testified that she did not want to be spanked, but felt that Goldsborough was trying to teach her to be a good secretary. When asked if she believed she could lose her job if she did not submit to the spankings, Schisler testified that she thought so, “because I wouldn’t be learning, and I wouldn’t be trying to correct my mistakes.” In November 1987, Goldsborough’s wife heard of the spankings and suggested that Schisler leave her job. Mrs. Golds-borough referred Schisler to counseling, for which Mrs. Goldsborough paid. Schisler also received over three times her gross weekly salary in severance pay.

In D.C., a “moral turpitude” felony conviction draws automatic disbarment.

I roundly applaud the BPR’s common sense approach of considering, rather then ignoring, admitted facts in determining whether a convicted attorney gets a hearing prior to sanction. 

A perfect example of the bad old approach is linked here.

The attorney in the above-cited case has been suspended and awaiting a hearing for nine years.

If he had been disbarred as inevitable under the new procedure, he would have been eligible for reinstatement for years.

The crimes are described in a news report

A Philadelphia lawyer has been jailed for making a 12-year-old boy from the famed Bolshoi Ballet Academy his sex slave for six years….he will spend the next 15 years behind bars.

And from the United States Attorney’s office of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

In the summer of 1998, Schneider, founder and president of the Apogee Foundation, traveled to Moscow, Russia where he told two ballet instructors at the Moscow State Academy of Choreography that he was willing to provide “assistance” to students attending the academy. The instructors identified a 12-year old student whose family could no longer afford to pay his board. Schneider convinced the boy’s parents to allow him to live with Schneider in an apartment a few blocks from the school. Between August 22, 2000 and November 22, 2001, Schneider engaged in a sexual relationship with the victim, bringing him to Philadelphia for a summer program in 2001, then returning to Moscow with the victim in August 2001 to continue the sexual relationship. Schneider was arrested March 27, 2010 in Larnaca, Cyprus.

The new policy- if and when adopted – would avoid such results. (Mike Frisch)