Is Advertising For “Recent Law Graduates” Discriminatory?

The District of Columbia Public Service Commission Office of General Counsel advertised positions for “recent law graduates” and drew an age discrimination suit that has led to a remand by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

The plaintiff avers that he is 60 years old and was deterred from applying due to the language.

The trial court had dismissed the action

This appeal followed. Appellant urges us to hold that he needed no proof of the typical age of a new law school graduate because the term “recent law school graduate” in an advertisement for a specific job is per se discriminatory. The District disagrees, arguing that the surrounding context in the PSC announcement makes clear that the statement that the applicant should be a “recent law school graduate” denotes that the advertised positions were entry-level positions “wherein a law degree is required but having worked as a lawyer is not.” But the District’s lead-off argument is that we should resolve the matter on the ground that Mr. Moeller lacked standing to challenge the Job ID 18523 announcement a discriminatory because he neither applied for the positions advertised nor demonstrated a real interest in the jobs.

Standing 

We conclude that the record reveals a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Mr. Moeller had “a real, present interest” in the advertised PSC positions and was actually deterred from applying because of the “recent law school graduate” language of the notice. We think Judge Saddler got it right when she initially denied summary judgment on the ground that “the determination regarding whether [Mr. Moeller] was actually deterred from applying to the position based upon the alleged ageist language in the Commission’s May 23, 2018 announcement is a disputed factual issue.” It appears to us that nothing had changed to resolve that issue when the court ruled on the reconsideration motions.

Thus

Because the Superior Court did not resolve the factual issues germane to standing, we conclude that a remand is necessary for that court, after conducting any further proceedings it deems necessary, to resolve the factual question on which jurisdiction depends.

(Mike Frisch)