Who Speaks For Vern? Judge Hotten In Dissent

The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that non-economic damages are not available for the tortious  shooting death of a beloved Chesapeake Bay retriever by a police officer.

The death occurred when the dog approached the officer, who was going door-to-door investigating a “spate” of burglaries.

The sole  living witness was the officer.

Officer Price testified that he put his left forearm up at “roughly” the level of his neck as the dog approached. Officer Price stated that the dog placed its front paws on his forearm for about one second. He recalled taking one step back and pushing the dog away from him. Afraid that the dog was going to attack his face, Officer Price testified that he shot the dog twice while the dog’s paws were still on his left arm. The dog then made a screeching noise and limped across the yard, where the dog collapsed. After the shooting, Officer Price informed dispatch of what happened, saying “a dog came at me.” According to Officer Price, the dog did not bite or scratch him during the incident.

Officer Price is 5’8” and, at the time of the incident, weighed about 250 pounds. He testified that he had a taser, baton, and mace on his person at the time. Furthermore, he admitted that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog. At the time of the incident, Officer Price had been a sworn officer for less than a year.

Vern’s owner on the impact of the death

After the testimony of his two sons, Mr. Reeves took the stand. He stated that he became interested in training dogs while stationed in Afghanistan. Mr. Reeves explained that he purchased Vern for $3,000 with the goal of eventually breeding Chesapeake Bay retrievers. He took a year off from work to train the dog. Mr. Reeves taught Vern voice commands, silent commands, and water training. Mr. Reeves testified that Vern “was my best friend in the world, period.”

Mr. Reeves also testified that he was taking medication to cope with the loss of Vern. He stated that he no longer had any plans to breed Chesapeake Bay retrievers. Timothy testified that his father moved from Maryland to California after Vern was killed, and that the family “had all left because that incident for my father has just destroyed him.”

The jury spoke

The jury then found that Officer Price was grossly negligent and awarded Mr. Reeves $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $1,250,000. Finally, for the trespass to chattel claim, the jury awarded Mr. Reeves $10,000 in economic damages. The jury also made a factual finding on the verdict sheet that the dog was not attacking Officer Price at the time of the shooting.

On May 18, 2017, Petitioners filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and/or a new trial. The circuit court denied the motion in full. The circuit court then reduced the jury award for trespass to chattel from $10,000 to $7,500, pursuant to CJP § 11-110. The court further reduced the total damages award for the gross negligence claim from $1,250,000 to $200,000 pursuant to the LGTCA, resulting in Mr. Reeves receiving a total of $207,500 in damages. 

On review of the decision of the Court of Special Appeals

Here, Mr. Reeves’ gross negligence and trespass to chattel claims are premised on the same set of operative facts. They are thus alternative legal theories for the same recovery. Therefore, Mr. Reeves is entitled to one recovery as compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Reeves suffered a tragic loss, the only injury before us for which Mr. Reeves can recover is the death of his dog, because the jury awarded no damages for the constitutional harms.

…In sum, the plain meaning of CJP § 11-110 is that it defines what compensatory damages are available in the case of the tortious injury to or death of a pet and limits the total amount that may be recovered. It does not allow for recovery of other forms of compensatory damages not expressly included therein.

As to gross negligence

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Reeves, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Mr. Reeves presented sufficient evidence at trial for a rational juror to find that Officer Price was grossly negligent. Thus, we uphold the circuit court’s denial of the Petitioners’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, despite the fact that there was sufficient evidence on the gross negligence claim, as explained above Mr. Reeves’ damages are limited to $7,500 for his claims, as both the trespass to chattel claim and the gross negligence claim sought recovery for the same harm and both are torts covered by CJP § 11-110. Thus, consistent with the jury’s award and the circuit court’s reduction of the award, Mr. Reeves is limited to $7,500 on his trespass to chattel claim, and $0 on his alternative gross negligence claim.

In other words: the jury giveth; the court taketh away.

A moving dissent by Judge Michele  Hotten notes a trend in favor of expanded compensation for pet owners

Marylanders have strong emotional bonds with their pets, especially their dogs. Most people, including Mr. Reeves, considered his dog a part of the family and “his best friend in the world[.]” The designation of dogs as mere personal property belies common experience, cultural values, and societal expectations. Treating dogs as mere property also erases a dog’s intrinsic attributes as a living being and the ir replaceable instinct to love and protect human companions. A dog, unlike an inanimate object, welcomes its human companion after a day at work, protects its human companion when in danger, and exhibits behavior and emotions that is consistent with grief and distress when its human companion is ill, injured, or passes away. Given prevailing societal values, attitudes, and norms, it no longer appears tenable to deny emotional damages for a cherished family dog, killed with gross negligence, in the same way that the common law precludes emotional damages for an inanimate object that was accidentally broken.

…The Majority has missed an opportunity to recognize pets, not just as emotive, intelligent, loving, and cherished members of our families, but as representing more than mere personal property. In the past, courts did not wait for legislative enactment to expand the concept of personage when societal needs, values, and interests demanded it. This Court can break from precedent when “passage of time and evolving events” render it “archaic or inapplicable to modern society[.]” State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 520, 103 A.3d 618, 627 (2014). Greater legal protection of beloved family pets is long overdue.

The average Marylander may be surprised to hear that while the law treats a caring, loyal, and vivacious pet dog as personal property, it treats a corporation as a person.

And a cite to Dred Scott and the doctrine of coverture

The legal arc of Maryland is one of progress and bends inexorably towards greater recognition of rights. The common law designation of pets as personal property, rooted in legal formalism, conflicts with society’s values and the trajectory of common law in Maryland and throughout the country. Our pets are more than just living beings. They are widely considered best friends, guardians, and members of the family. Maryland law should recognize and bestow pets with the same degree of dignity.

Given my own personal experience with dogs, I can only say that Judge Hotten speaks for me. (Mike Frisch)