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State Supreme Court Candidate Sanctioned By State Supreme Court

Neither laches nor the First Amendment insulated a former candidate for the Minnesota Supreme Court from professional discipline, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court

MacDonald first asserts the defense of laches. She argues that the Director unfairly delayed by waiting to bring this disciplinary action until March 2020, although the underlying events took place in June and October 2018. Although the delay is not explained by the record, the referee correctly rejected MacDonald’s defense. The doctrine of laches bars prosecution of a disciplinary petition only when the attorney has been unfairly prejudiced by the delay.

As to her comments

MacDonald’s next, and primary, defense is that her comments during the interview are protected by the First Amendment. We construe her brief as advancing the following arguments: (1) her statements were nonactionable opinion, (2) her statements were true, (3) the referee applied the wrong legal standard for determining whether MacDonald’s speech was protected, and (4) the referee failed to apply strict scrutiny review. None of these arguments has merit.

Turning to MacDonald’s first argument, we conclude that her comments were statements of fact, not of opinion…

Without a doubt, MacDonald is free to speak her opinion about what due process should entail. But her comment was not an opinion; it was a statement of fact. MacDonald asserted that a particular order in a particular case was issued without any hearing or any due process. That claim is specific and verifiable.

As to her candidacy

Relying on Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), MacDonald also argues that her statements were protected because she was commenting on legal issues as a candidate for judicial office, which, according to MacDonald, should merit greater constitutional protection. Her reliance is misplaced. White struck down a rule of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that broadly prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. Id. at 788. But White did not hold that a candidate may knowingly or recklessly make false statements of fact about the integrity of judicial officers without consequence, which is the issue here.

Neither did White conclude that candidates for judicial office receive greater constitutional protection than other lawyers. As a candidate for judicial office, MacDonald was obligated to follow the rules of professional conduct, and MacDonald’s knowingly false statements about a judge, made during a public interview as a candidate for judicial office, are not protected by White.

The court ordered an indefinite suspension of at least four months with reinstatement conditioned on passing a professional responsibility examination. (Mike Frisch)