The Georgia Supreme Court has rejected an attorney’s second petition for voluntary discipline and remanded the matter to a special master for fact-finding on several matters.
Van Dyke, a Texas resident, is licensed to practice law in Texas and several other jurisdictions, including Georgia. In September 2018, Van Dyke called local police to report the theft of several items from his truck. After police interviewed his then-roommate, Van Dyke was arrested for making a false report. Van Dyke contested the charges. By his own
admission, Van Dyke violated the conditions of his bond while his charges were pending.
Shortly before trial, the roommate, whom the State had planned to call as a witness, went missing. Contending that Van Dyke had procured the unavailability of the witness, the State filed a motion seeking forfeiture by wrongdoing, which was granted. Van Dyke then agreed to enter a plea of nolo contendere and, on February 26, 2019, Van Dyke entered his plea before the Denton County, Texas Criminal Court Number Five on one count of making a false report to a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to 24 months’ deferred adjudication community supervision, with special conditions.
The proceeding was initiated as a result of the criminal disposition
In his petition, Van Dyke recites a lengthy chronology of events that, he claims, forms the backdrop for his arrest and supports his claim of innocence as to the false report offense. In sum, Van Dyke asserts that the criminal prosecution stemmed from a campaign of harassment waged against him by an individual who, Van Dyke claims, has been stalking, defaming, and harassing him since 2017. He also claims to have obtained evidence that another individual has confessed to the theft from his truck, though he has since, in a supplemental filing upon inquiry by this Court, conceded that a petition for habeas corpus he filed in an apparent effort to vindicate himself has now been denied.
Here
As referenced above, Van Dyke has recently submitted a supplemental filing notifying the Court that, on February 26, 2021, the Denton County, Texas court entered an order discharging him from his sentence, releasing him from deferred adjudication, and dismissing his case. Thus, were we at this point to accept Van Dyke’s petition, his suspension will have expired before it ever started. This we cannot accept, particularly because Van Dyke remains on suspension – albeit in probated form – in three other jurisdictions.
We are also troubled by several aspects of this case that, we believe, warrant additional fact-finding. First, we note that Van Dyke’s conduct in the criminal proceeding reflects a level of disrespect for the law and legal process that warrants serious consideration. In his petition, Van Dyke readily admitted to willfully violating his bond conditions. And there remains a judicial determination that Van Dyke procured the unavailability of a witness in his criminal case. However, beyond the passing mention of these issues in Van Dyke’s petition, we know nothing about the particulars of this conduct that, on its face, demonstrates a disturbing lack of regard for the law and legal process.
In addition, it appears from review of one of the above-referenced suspension orders, issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, that Van Dyke was sanctioned by the Texas Bar in an entirely separate proceeding in February 2019; according to this order, Van Dyke was suspended from the practice of law for 12 months, from March 1, 2019 through February 29, 2020. It is unclear what misconduct gave rise to this sanction, but what is clear is that Van Dyke did not make this Court aware of this prior discipline.
On remand
we reject Van Dyke’s Second Petition for Voluntary Discipline and remand to the Special Master for additional fact-finding regarding (1) all disciplinary proceedings involving Van Dyke, past or current and in any jurisdiction, including but not limited to those giving rise to Van Dyke’s March 2019 suspension by the Texas Bar; (2) Van Dyke’s violation of his bond conditions in the Texas criminal proceeding; (3) the basis for the forfeiture by wrongdoing determination; and (4) any other matters the Special Master deems relevant.
(Mike Frisch)