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Mental Condition Mitigates Sanction

The New Jersey Supreme Court has admonished an attorney based on findings below that most of the misconduct was attributable to mental incapacity. 

The Disciplinary Review Board rejected a proposed one-year suspension by the District Ethics Committee and noted his impairment

Specifically, respondent claimed to be the victim of a September 1, 2016 physical assault that left him with significant head trauma and resultant hallucinations and delusions. Respondent proffered that, prior to assault, his mental state had been deteriorating, and that, following the assault, he repeatedly was hospitalized, culminating in his involuntary commitment, in November 2016, in a medical facility. He provided details regarding his asserted beliefs that he should be appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States, that he was best friends with Warren Buffett, and that he was the richest man in the world. 

The attorney had an attorney-trustee appointed, declared bankruptcy and was involuntarily committed for four days.

The DRB found only a single violation among the several charged matters

Despite the case presented by respondent, including the detailed, alarming  testimony regarding his mental health issues during the relevant timeframe,  which the presenters did not credibly refute, the DEC wholly rejected respondent’s defense and request for mitigation, in respect of his mental health during the relevant time period, in singular reliance on the Jacob standard.

The charged misconduct occurred during the period of incapacity

Regardless of blame, it is clear from the record that respondent’s clients suffered great harm in connection with his mental illness. Their $18,000 in combined retainers were either stolen, spent, or discharged in bankruptcy, without their legal needs having been met. They were not advised, as they should have been, that respondent was required to cease the practice of law during the pendency of the trusteeship and, thus, they were left in limbo regarding whether respondent represented them. Indeed, respondent continued to practice law, intermittently, throughout the trusteeship, with his “good and bad days,” despite the appointment of the attorney-trustee and his involuntary commitment and intermittent hospitalizations. These circumstances should not have been allowed to occur and represents a  shortcoming of our attorney-trustee system, rather than intentional misconduct on respondent’s part.

Simply stated, the record supports the conclusion that respondent’s behavior toward these clients during this period was clearly attributable to his mental illness. The failure of the court and the attorney-trustee to restrain him from the practice of law does not render his conduct during the trusteeship unethical. 

However

due to the nature of respondent’s admitted mental illness, we require respondent, within days of the date of the Court’s order in this matter, to provide to the OAE (1) proof of psychiatric treatment, and (2) proof of fitness to practice law, as attested by a qualified mental health professional approved by the OAE.

The court adopted this condition in its order. (Mike Frisch)