No Hac Vice
An Illinois Hearing Committee proposes that an unusual request be denied
Petitioner was licensed to practice law in New York in 2003 and thereafter moved to Illinois. Although he was never admitted to practice law in Illinois, Petitioner represented clients in Illinois state court on a pro hac vice basis. On January 29, 2019 the Illinois Supreme Court suspended Petitioner for 90 days until further order of Court.
Petitioner filed a petition requesting reinstatement to his pre-disciplinary status of being able to practice law in Illinois on a pro hac vice basis, and the Administrator filed objections. After considering the six factors set forth in Supreme Court Rule 767 as well as other evidence, the Hearing Board concluded that Petitioner had not met his burden of proving his good character, current knowledge of the law and rehabilitation. The Hearing Board is recommending the petition be denied.
Reasons
Applying the Rule 767 factors to this matter, we conclude that Petitioner engaged in serious misconduct as a mature and experienced attorney, and did not demonstrate that he fully recognizes the severity of his wrongdoing or that he respects the authority of the Court. Most significant to our decision, however, is his improper conduct during his suspension period and his lack of candor and forthrightness in his dealings with the Administrator. Those factors are fatal to Petitioner’s reinstatement request.
Moreover, Petitioner did not sufficiently establish his general good character. He presented numerous character witnesses who expressed high opinions of his willingness to help other people, his diligence, and his honesty but, as we stated previously, some of the witnesses received assistance from Petitioner on a pro bono basis, which fact may contribute to a bias in his favor. Conversely, we heard unfavorable character testimony from Deanne Medina and Jack Terpstra, both of whom were credible, with respect to their dealings with Petitioner, their belief that he misrepresented his position, and the harm he caused to their client or judicial proceedings. Finally, we cannot overlook a comment Petitioner made during his opening statement that “[t]he evidence will show that dishonest people tend to be of a lower intelligence.” (Tr. 17). That remark indicates an arrogance that reflects negatively on his character.
The evidence regarding Petitioner’s current knowledge of the law was not persuasive. He admittedly has not completed any CLE classes since his suspension in January 2019, nor did he submit any certificates showing when he last completed any courses. His testimony regarding his fulfillment of CLE requirements for the New York bar was vague as to timing, although we assume he did submit the required forms to maintain his New York license. We also note Petitioner’s failure to understand the continuing nature of his suspension, and the criticism he has received from various courts as to arguments on diversity jurisdiction. The fact he has mishandled the same issue more than once is an indication he has not bothered to re-educate himself on basic principles. Petitioner’s citation to less recent cases in which he represented the prevailing party does not reassure us as to his current knowledge of the law.
(Mike Frisch)