Consent Sanction Questioned In Public Member Dissent
A consent disposition was approved by the two attorneys members of an Ad Hoc District of Columbia Hearing Committee.
The representation involved a violent death in custody
On January 18, 2010, Carlton Coltrane, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Pollock, Louisiana, (“USP Pollock”) was stabbed to death by another inmate.
On May 7, 2010, Carlton’s mother, Mary Coltrane, entered into a contingency fee agreement with Respondent to render legal services on her behalf against anyone liable for Carlton’s death.
The misconduct involves lack of competence, diligence and communication as well as false statements to the client
Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel have agreed that the sanction in this matter should be a 90-day suspension, with 60 days stayed in favor of a one-year period of unsupervised probation with conditions…
Were this a contested disciplinary hearing, it is possible that a moderately more severe sanction would be recommended. However, since this is a negotiated disposition, a strict comparability analysis does not apply, and it is not this Hearing Committee’s role to modify a proposed sanction that is otherwise “justified” and not “unduly lenient.”
The client victim opposed the consent sanction as a “slap on the hand.”
There was a rare but impassioned dissent from the non-attorney member
In volunteering to serve as a representative for the voice of the D.C. public in the oversight of lawyer professional responsibility, I understood that I was a quite literal reminder that ultimately there are people involved in the matters that come before the Hearing Committees. These matters can be of considerable consequence to a lawyer’s clients, especially when they are left without a sought-after remedy as a result of a lawyer’s failure to serve their client in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Considering the facts of this case, especially in the face of Ms. Coltrane’s strenuous and repeatedly stated objections, together with the precedent discussed above, the modest sanction agreed to in these proceedings is unduly lenient because it does not account for the real harm done to the real people by Respondent’s conduct.
The dissent gives the matter a human face
For the last decade, throughout the period of his flawed representation of Ms. Coltrane, and the years since that representation came to naught, Mr. Wilkins has continued in active practice, seemingly without any material interruption. After all this time, Mr. Wilkins is facing a suspension of modest duration – a 90-day suspension, with 60 days stayed in favor of a year of unsupervised probation, and requirements to avail himself of resources meant to improve the management and conduct of his practice.
By contrast, since her son’s death, that same decade for Ms. Coltrane has been one of protracted anguish punctuated and exacerbated by repeated disappointments and setbacks dealt her by the courts, the consequences of her lawyer’s apparent incompetence and numerous procedural missteps. At the limited hearing, Ms. Coltrane explained that “I trusted Mr. Wilkins, relied on his advice and instruction to help me learn what happened — about what happened to my son.” Tr. 68. Clients seeking money damages who are harmed by their lawyer’s misconduct may seek recompence from the lawyer and/or the lawyer’s malpractice insurance carrier. However, clients like Ms. Coltrane, who turned to a lawyer to obtain information, may never be made whole. As a result of Respondent’s misconduct, it appears that Ms. Coltrane has lost the opportunity to use legal process to learn how her son died. She is no closer today to having a proper accounting of the circumstances surrounding the violent death of her son while he was in the custody of the federal government than she was when she first engaged the services of Respondent in 2010. Money damages cannot make her whole.
(Mike Frisch)