The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded the grant of summary judgment to legal malpractice defendants

In March 2017, Faye Rennell Hobson (“Plaintiff”) was acting as a pro se litigant against a former United States Secretary of Defense in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiff alleged racial discrimination by the Department of Defense after it decided not to hire her for several teaching positions. Joshua A. Frank and Scott P. Tift (collectively “Defendants”) were appointed to be Plaintiff’s trial attorneys in her federal case. Defendants represented Plaintiff without charge and with no expectation of compensation.

During their time as Plaintiff’s attorneys, Defendants filed several motions in limine, frequently communicated with Plaintiff to obtain input and discuss trial strategy, participated in several pre-trial conferences, reviewed thousands of pages of discovery in preparation for trial, and litigated the three-day jury trial. Defendants claim that they and their staff logged over 700 hours working for Plaintiff. Despite these efforts, the jury returned a verdict for the former Secretary of Defense.

The next day, Plaintiff informed Defendants via email that they were “no longer [her] official attorneys of record” and that they no longer had authorization to act on her behalf because “[she] resumed pro se status, the moment the trial ended.” Within hours, Defendants filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which the district court granted. After
an unsuccessful appeal, Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim.

The former client had sued in federal court but eventually the court with jurisdiction but on the merits

To support her claim, Plaintiff takes issue with Defendants’ decisions not to file a motion for default judgment or to request a new trial in her previous case. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants concealed favorable evidence, conspired with opposing counsel to ensure she would be unsuccessful, and maintained a personal bias against her.

Defendants secured a favorable expert opinion; plaintiff did not.

we hold that the affidavits submitted by Defendants constitute expert proof that Defendants exercised the required standard of care while representing Plaintiff.

(Mike Frisch)