Sexist Slurs Should Draw Suspension

An Illinois Hearing Board recommends a three-month suspension

The Hearing Board found that Respondent engaged in the misconduct charged in both counts. Respondent’s use of the offensive language had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden the other attorneys involved and was also prejudicial to the administration of justice.

With opposing counsel

Although Respondent admitted he twice called Ms. Lindbert “Cuntney” in the hallway of the federal courthouse, he disputed Ms. Lindbert’s testimony regarding what preceded these remarks. According to Respondent, he made these statements after Ms. Lindbert first said to him, “I’m going to take your fucking license. You’re a piece of shit.” Respondent testified that he tried to walk away because he did not want a confrontation, but Ms. Lindbert kept coming after him and asking if he had heard her. Respondent perceived her statement as a threat to try to get him to drop the Wyman case. He testified that he felt “bullied” and “pushed into a corner.” He denied that he was trying to intimidate or embarrass Ms. Lindbert or get her off the case. (Tr. 115, 122-23, 141-42, 162-63).

Later after a motions hearing

The next day, Saturday evening December 3, 2016, at 10:46 p.m., Ms. Lindbert received the following email message from Respondent on her work email:

Cuntney Lindbitch, your days of filing unnecessary, frivolous motions and abusing and harassing attorneys with disabilities will come to an end. This last effort by you?trying to prejudice me by claiming that a timely filing was filed “untimely and without leave of court” was over the top. Your client will soon see that it is YOU, not me, who is “bleeding it dry.”

Then

After the email incident, Mr. Casson reported Respondent’s conduct in both the Wyman and Knapp matters to the Hon. Reuben Castillo, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. On December 13, 2016, the Executive Committee of the U.S. District Court (Executive Committee) issued a rule to show cause directing Respondent to show cause why discipline should not be imposed for his use of “vulgar language in reference to opposing counsel both in person and in an e-mail.” (Ans. at par. 7; Tr. 51, 57; Adm. Exs. 2, 3).

Respondent submitted a written response to the rule to show cause in which he admitted making the remarks and apologized for his conduct, but also blamed Ms. Lindbert for instigating his responses.

On January 18, 2017, the Executive Committee entered an order finding that Respondent violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) by “engage[ing] in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of . . . sex” by twice using gender-based, vulgar terms to insult his opposing counsel.³ The Executive Committee found that the insults were directly related to the litigation, and Respondent use of the slurs was intended to intimidate his opposing counsel in the representation of her client. (Ans. at par. 8; Tr. 57, 126; Adm. Ex. 2).

The Executive Committee ordered that Respondent be suspended from the General Bar of the Northern District of Illinois for 12 months and stricken from the Trial Bar. Although he was allowed to petition for reinstatement to the General Bar after 6 months, he was required to demonstrate he had sought professional assistance to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and to deal effectively with his anger management. He was allowed to petition for reinstatement to the Trial Bar after 12 months. (Ans. at par. 8; Tr. 166; Adm. Ex. 2).

Respondent petitioned for reinstatement to the General Bar after six months, but that petition was denied. He petitioned again six months later and was reinstated to both the General and Trial Bars on February 16, 2018. In his petition, Respondent provided proof of his participation in anger management therapy. (Tr. 166-67; Resp. Exs. 1, 3).

Sanction

After considering precedent, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the goals of the disciplinary process, we conclude that a three-month suspension is appropriate discipline in this matter. This is within the range of sanctions imposed in cases involving misconduct of this nature. While it is debatable whether Respondent’s misconduct is as serious as in the cases at the higher end of this range, we believe it warrants more than the minimum sanction. This is particularly true since Respondent’s misconduct involved multiple incidents as well as significant additional aggravation.

We also note that while precedent was considered, each case is unique and must be decided based on its own facts. After considering the particular facts and circumstances in this case, we believe that a meaningful period of suspension is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the disciplinary process. Respondent’s misconduct presents a particularly egregious example of incivility as well as the mistreatment of women in the legal profession. Such grossly unprofessional conduct brings the entire profession into disrepute. We believe a message needs to be sent to Respondent as well as the rest of the bar that such conduct is unacceptable, will not be tolerated, and will be met with serious consequences. We also believe that the Illinois bar should be ahead of, not behind, society’s long overdue attention to misogyny. Our sanction recommendation also reflects these concerns.

(Mike Frisch)