Hate Not Great

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reinstated a criminal conviction in an opinion authored by Circuit Judge Wynn joined by Circuit Judge Motz. 

Defendant James Hill, III (“Defendant”) boastfully admitted to physically and violently assaulting a coworker preparing packages for interstate sale and shipment because of the coworker’s sexual orientation. But after a jury convicted Defendant for violating the Hate Crimes Act, the district court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on grounds that the Hate Crimes Act, as applied to Defendant’s conduct, exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Because we conclude that as applied to Defendant’s conduct, the Hate Crimes Act easily falls under Congress’s broad authority to regulate interstate commerce, we reverse and remand to the district court to reinstate the jury’s guilty verdict.

Impact on interstate commerce

At the time of the physical assault, [victim] Tibbs was pulling boxes and packaging them for interstate shipment. As a result of the assault, the packages prepared by Tibbs flew into the air and onto the ground. After the assault, Amazon closed the entire area where Tibbs and Defendant were working so that Tibbs’s blood could be cleaned off the floor. And because of the assault, Tibbs missed the rest of his shift, and his work had to be absorbed by other facility employees.

Holding

In sum, the Hate Crimes Act as applied required the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant’s assault on Tibbs “interfere[d] with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim [was] engaged at the time of the conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). The evidence introduced by the Government at trial provided the jury with a more-than-adequate basis to make such a finding.

In establishing that Congress has the authority to proscribe Defendant’s assault of Tibbs, we simply follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court regarding the constitutionality of prosecutions under the Hobbs Act and the federal arson statute. And there is no good reason to carve out a special exception to allow criminals who commit sexual orientation hate crimes under similar circumstances to avoid these well-established precedents.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment of acquittal and remand for reinstatement of the jury’s guilty verdict.

AGEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Like the majority, I believe that the proper outcome in this case naturally flows from the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause precedent and the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). Unlike the majority, I conclude that Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause does not permit Hill’s prosecution under that statute. This is so for two principal reasons. First, unlike the other provisions of § 249(a)(2)(B)—and, indeed, unlike “jurisdictional elements” in other statutes—§ 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) does not limit the class of activities being regulated to acts that fall under Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Second, the root activity § 249(a)(2) regulated in this case—a bias-motivated punch—is not an inherently economic activity and therefore not within the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. For the reasons expounded below, I would affirm the district court’s decision to vacate Hill’s conviction and respectfully dissent.

(Mike Frisch)