No Second Bite

A justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court imposed reciprocal discipline based on a five-year Florida suspension for misconduct as a judge. 

On October 4, 2018, the respondent consented to disbarment by the Supreme Court of Florida for a term of five years in relation to misconduct alleged to have occurred while the respondent was serving as a circuit court judge for the 17th Judicial Circuit in Broward County, Florida.  In so doing, he stipulated that there was probable cause for further disciplinary proceedings as to the following allegations: (1) respondent caused inaccurate representations of his actual time spent in the performance of his judicial duties; (2) respondent utilized his judicial assistant to perform personal duties on his behalf which were excessive; (3) respondent entered orders in certain matters without a sufficient basis to do so; and (4) respondent demonstrated a lack of sympathy toward some litigants, lawyers, and court personnel. He also admitted that the foregoing allegations, if proven, would constitute a violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, specifically, Rule 4.8-4(d), which essentially prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct “in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

The court rejected the attorney’s claim that he did not engage in misconduct

In choosing to surrender membership in the Florida Bar in lieu of defending against the allegations of disciplinary violations, the respondent foreclosed the possibility that the alleged conduct would be “proven.”

The South Florida Sun Sentinel reported on the Florida action.

I dealt with a (similarly meritless) claim in a District of Columbia reciprocal discipline case from Florida. 

In 1988, the Florida Bar initiated an investigation of Respondent, Karen S. Day, for misappropriation of client trust account funds.   Day resigned from the Florida Bar without leave to seek reinstatement before the investigation was completed.   Day takes exception to the Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (the “Board”), which recommends that this court disbar Day from practice in the District of Columbia as reciprocal discipline for conduct that caused her to voluntarily resign from the Florida Bar.   Bar Counsel agrees with the Board’s recommendation.

Taking exception to the Board’s recommendation, Day argues that disbarment is not warranted in this case because at least three of the five exceptions to mandatory reciprocal discipline, under D.C.Bar Rule XI, § 11(c), apply to her case.   Specifically, she claims that there is no evidence of any wrongdoing that would have warranted disbarment under the Code of Professional Responsibility in effect in this jurisdiction in 1988.   In this regard, Day places great significance on the distinct Florida disciplinary rules that do not require an admission of wrongdoing as a condition of voluntary resignation.   We conclude that because Day’s resignation from the Florida Bar while a disciplinary proceeding was pending against her constituted “discipline,” and none of the exceptions to reciprocal discipline apply to her case, the Rules of the District of Columbia Bar require the imposition of reciprocal discipline.   We also conclude that Day’s due process rights are not violated by the imposition of reciprocal discipline.

(Mike Frisch)