Base Vile And Depraved

The District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility recommends the statutory disbarment of Paul J Manafort

D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) requires the disbarment of a member of the District of Columbia Bar convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. The legal standard for moral turpitude was established in In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1979) (en banc). In Colson, the Court held that a crime involves moral turpitude if “the act denounced by the statute offends the generally accepted moral code of mankind,” if it involves “baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man,” or if the act is “contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Id. at 1168 (internal citations omitted). Once the Court determine that a particular crime involves moral turpitude per se, the Board must adhere to that ruling and disbarment must be imposed. Id. at 1165.

Respondent pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). The Court has not yet considered whether a violation of § 1512(b)(1) is a crime of moral turpitude per se. However, the Court has already found that convictions under subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) are crimes of moral turpitude per se. In re Johnson, 48 A.3d 170, 173 (D.C. 2012) (per curiam) (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)); In re Blair, 40 A.3d 883, 884 (D.C. 2012) (per curiam) (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)). Johnson explained that “witness and evidence tampering ‘is similar to the offense of obstruction of justice, which we have held to involve moral turpitude in that the offender knowingly or intentionally disregards the system of law and due process that defines our civilized society.’” Johnson, 48  A.3d at 174 (quoting In re Luvara, 942 A.2d 1125, 1127 (D.C. 2008)); see Colson, 412 A.2d at 1165 (obstruction of justice inherently involves moral turpitude). We see no significant difference between subsections (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3), because all require proof of a knowing interference with the enforcement of law, and we thus conclude that witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) constitutes a crime of moral turpitude per se.

“[W]here, as here, the object of the conspiracy is a crime involving moral turpitude, a conviction for conspiracy to commit the underlying offense is itself a crime inherently involving moral turpitude.” In re Lobar, 632 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam). In re Gormley, 793 A.2d 469, 470 (D.C. 2002) (per curiam) (“conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice is a crime of moral turpitude per se.”).

“When an attorney is convicted of multiple offenses, disbarment is imposed if any one of them involves moral turpitude per se,” and thus, we need not analyze the other offenses covered by Respondent’s guilty plea. See In re Hoover-Hankerson, 953 A.2d 1025, 1026 (D.C. 2008) (per curiam).

The case law provides that the Court defer final action until the criminal process is concluded.

Non-attorney board member David Bernstein authored the report. (Mike Frisch)