No Suspension For Public Defender

The California State Bar Court Review Department ordered a public reproval with conditions rather than the suspension proposed by the hearing judge

Delia Marie Metoyer, a veteran public defender, answered ready for trial in a felony matter. During pretrial discussions, Metoyer requested time off the next day for a medical appointment. When the judge initially denied her request, Metoyer became emotionally distressed. After receiving permission to use the restroom, she did not return to the courtroom. Instead, she sought assistance from her supervisor, who removed her from the case and reassigned the matter to another public defender. The judge later sanctioned Metoyer $1,500 for failure to obey a court order and for client abandonment, which the Court of Appeal affirmed. Metoyer paid the sanctions, but failed to report them to the State Bar.

In this, her first disciplinary proceeding, Metoyer stipulated that she failed to report judicial sanctions. The hearing judge further found her culpable of violating a court order and improperly withdrawing from representation; he recommended a 30-day actual suspension.

Metoyer appeals. She challenges the hearing judge’s culpability findings, although she admits she could have handled the situation better. She argues that the disciplinary recommendation is excessive, and seeks an admonition or reproval for her stipulated misconduct.

The Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar (OCTC) did not cross-appeal and requests that we affirm the disciplinary recommendation.

After independently reviewing the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12), and giving due weight to our disciplinary law, the findings of the courts of record, and the hearing judge, we find Metoyer culpable of violating a court order, but not for improperly withdrawing from employment. We find that her misconduct, precipitated by an unexpected and severe emotional episode, warrants a departure from the presumed sanction of actual suspension given Metoyer’s dedicated, lengthy, and, thus far, blemish-free career with the public defender’s office and the lack of client harm. We find that a public reproval with conditions, rather than the 30-day actual suspension recommended by the hearing judge, is appropriate discipline that protects the public, the profession, and the courts.

The incident occurred in a felony child molestation case

At 9:00 a.m., Judge Eleanor Hunter called the matter for trial. She invited Metoyer and the prosecutor into chambers for an informal, pretrial discussion about witnesses, motions, and trial estimates. When the approximately 20- to 30-minute conversation concluded, Metoyer informed the judge that she had a scheduled MRI the next day for a back injury she had sustained at work a week earlier. Since Judge Hunter saw no signs of physical distress and Metoyer had not previously mentioned this appointment, the judge told her to reschedule the MRI. On review, Metoyer acknowledges she had no physical discomfort that day, but emphasizes that she was anxious about the possibility of an unexpected recurrence of her back pain. Metoyer became emotionally distraught about delaying her scheduled MRI appointment as she had a hectic work schedule, including an impending murder trial. After Judge Hunter expressed her intent to proceed as scheduled, Metoyer began to cry. She told the judge that she had children to provide for and could not understand why her job was being placed above her health.

Judge Hunter directed the parties to return to the courtroom for formal discussions on the record. Metoyer then asked to use the back hallway restroom, which the judge permitted. While there, she called her supervisor, Rhonda May-Rucker. Metoyer did not tell Rucker where she was, other than to say she was in a restroom. Rucker had no idea Metoyer was still in the judge’s chambers area and believed she was calling from the public restroom outside of Metoyer’s office—located in the same building as the court, but on another floor. According to Rucker, Metoyer was upset, nearly incomprehensible, and said something to the effect, “They’re out to get me.” On this basis, and coupled with the fact that Metoyer sounded like she was crying, Rucker advised her to report to Rucker’s office.

There were discussions between the judge and the supervisor but the attorney did not return to court

As a result of Metoyer’s actions, Judge Hunter excused the prospective jury panel, and set an in-camera hearing for that afternoon. During the hearing, the judge indicated she would be initiating a sanctions proceeding against Metoyer, which she did in a written minute order entered later that day. Metoyer and her counsel were present at the sanctions hearing held on April 2, 2015. Metoyer did not call any witnesses or introduce any evidence other than her own declaration, wherein she denied any misconduct. Judge Hunter invited an apology from Metoyer at least twice during the hearing, but Metoyer declined to offer one, relying on her attorney’s instruction not to say anything.

The Review Board weighed mitigating and aggravating factors

We find that mitigation should be provided for Metoyer’s severe and unexpected emotional episode on January 15, 2015. Standard 1.6(d) provides that mitigation may be afforded for extreme emotional difficulties if (1) the attorney suffered from them at the time of the misconduct, (2) they are established by expert testimony as being directly responsible for the misconduct, and (3) they no longer pose a risk of future misconduct. The Stipulation, along with Metoyer’s and Rucker’s testimony, establish that Metoyer became emotionally distraught to the  extent that she did not return to the courtroom for her client’s trial, thus violating the order from the supervising judge in Department D.

While Metoyer did not provide expert testimony that her emotional state was directly responsible for her misconduct, she did convincingly testify that it was. (In the Matter of Ward (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 47, 59–60 [“some mitigating weight” assigned to personal stress factors established by lay testimony].) Finally, as we have considered her emotional distress to be an isolated occurrence, we find it unlikely to recur and cause Metoyer to commit future misconduct. Thus, we find mitigation under this circumstance, but assign only moderate weight.

No suspension

We find it appropriate that a more lenient sanction be imposed than the one recommended by the hearing judge and called for under standard 2.12(a). First, we have found less culpability than the judge did. Second, we have also found less aggravation and more mitigation than the judge did, and Metoyer’s mitigation is significant overall when balanced with her aggravation. She is a veteran public defender, with 15 years of dedicated public service and no previous discipline, who had one emotional episode that delayed court proceedings. She has engaged in community and volunteer work for well over a decade. Finally, her witnesses testified to her extraordinarily good character and exceptional advocacy and lawyering skills, and she cooperated during these proceedings.

(Mike Frisch)