A Lesser Type Of Theft

An attorney who was subject to two orders of suspension totalling two years by the Delaware Supreme Court received that same discipline prospectively from the New Jersey Supreme Court.

The attorney was an associate who stole from his law firm.

The case asked a straightforward question: Does the Wilson holding that knowing misappropriation mandates disbarment apply to law firm theft?

Nope, reasoned a majority of the Disciplinary Review Board, as such depredations violate contractual rather than fiduciary obligations.

There was a dissent of three members

respondent unequivocally and unconditionally admitted, before the Delaware Supreme Court, that he had knowingly misappropriated and stolen $6,444.44 of his law firm’s legal fees, in addition to $900 of his law firm’s funds, by covertly representing clients and litigating matters, in violation of the express terms of his employment contract. He kept the profits he had generated for himself…

Respondent held a position of trust and access at Lundy Law, as an associate, that was not unique, but is co~on at law firms. He had a duty not to breach the trust, access, and power he had at Lundy Law while acting on behalf of the firm. In sum, he was clearly a fiduciary of Lundy Law.

The facts of this case compel us to determine, just as in Siegel, Greenberq, Staropoli, Malanga, Leotti, Epstein, and LeBon, that there is no ethical distinction between respondent’s “prolonged, surreptitious misappropriation of firm funds and the misappropriation of client funds.” Siegel, supra, 133 N.J. at 168. This case presents neither “compelling mitigation,” as in Sigmon  nor a colorable business dispute to justify respondent’s retention of his firm’s funds.

(Mike Frisch)