Settled Law
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has publicly censured an attorney who pursued a settled and released claim on behalf of his clients.
He was retained to secure the return of a security deposit. The claim was settled and a full release of all potential defendants was signed by the clients.
Nonetheless
The Ruggieris did not feel they had been fully compensated, as they had incurred a legal fee to obtain the return of their deposit. They discussed with respondent what further actions may be available to them to secure complete recovery of their funds. It was at this point that respondent began a course of conduct that directly led to these disciplinary proceedings.
Matrone had not filed an answer in the civil action. Well aware that the $15,000 deposit had been returned, and even though respondent had prepared the settlement release which applied to the sellers and their agents (Matrone was at all times acting as the sellers’ agent), respondent sought and obtained a default judgment against Matrone on November 12, 2015. On December 18, 2015, he filed a motion for an oral proof of claim, with a hearing date of January 22, 2016. However, in his pleading he misidentified Matrone, and the notice was forwarded to the wrong address. Matrone did not receive the motion or notice of the hearing date.
On January 22, 2016, respondent and Paul Ruggieri appeared before a hearing justice on the scheduled motion. Matrone was not present. At the beginning of the hearing the justice specifically inquired of the respondent: “Are the defendants in default?” The respondent did not advise the court that his clients had previously received the return of their deposit. Rather, he responded: “Yes, your honor. There’s only one we are seeking relief against here.”
The court heard the testimony of respondent’s client. The respondent elicited testimony that Matrone did not refund the $15,000 deposit. However, he did not ask his client if the deposit had been returned by anyone else. He further asked his client: “[A]re you asking this Court for the entry of default judgment against her for that amount, $15,000, plus interests and costs?” The client answered: “Correct.”
Unaware that the $15,000 deposit had been returned, the hearing justice entered a judgment against Matrone for return of the $15,000, plus statutory interest, costs, and an attorneys’ fees award. Matrone became aware of the judgment when she was served with an execution. On her behalf, the William Raveis agency obtained legal counsel, and on March 31, 2016, respondent consented to an order vacating the judgment against Matrone. On October 7, 2016, the civil action against Matrone was voluntarily dismissed
with prejudice, and with no judgment, interest or costs.
Matrone filed the bar complaint.
Sanction
The board found many mitigating factors that impacted the severity of the recommended sanction. The respondent has been a member of the bar for 27 years. He has appeared before virtually all of the tribunals in this state, and this is his first disciplinary infraction. He has performed a significant amount of pro bono and reduced fee work for clients with the need, but without the means, for legal services. He has a reputation for honesty and courtesy in his dealings with the courts and with his peers. Additionally, he was fully cooperative in the disciplinary proceedings, recognized his misconduct, and accepted the consequences for his actions. After considering the agreed statement of facts and the significant mitigating factors, the board recommended that a public censure is appropriate in these proceedings.
After review of the board’s findings and recommendation, we concur with the board. We are deeply troubled by the respondent’s lack of candor in this matter. We have previously suspended attorneys from the practice of law for making misrepresentations to a court. See In re Vigue-Thurston, 143 A.3d 1080 (R.I. 2016) (sixty-day suspension); In re Gelfuso, 108 A.3d 208 (R.I. 2015) (thirty-day suspension). However, we believe the respondent has presented sufficient mitigating factors to warrant a departure from the severity of sanctions imposed in similar cases. In addition, we believe that the respondent is truly remorseful for his conduct, and that he is not likely to engage in similar acts in the future.
(Mike Frisch)