California Rejects Collateral Attack On Sanctions Order

A published opinion from the California State Bar Court Review Department proposes a 30-day suspension and rejected the conclusions of the hear ing judge

This matter is before us on appeal by the Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar (OCTC). OCTC charged Joseph Patrick Collins with five counts of failing to obey civil court sanctions orders, and Collins stipulated to all of the predicate facts as well as culpability. However, following a one-day trial on aggravation, mitigation, and the level of discipline, a hearing judge sua sponte dismissed the case, finding the sanctions orders were void or voidable and Collins had no obligation to comply with them. OCTC asks that we reverse the judge’s decision and find culpability. As to discipline, it seeks a one-year stayed suspension. Collins did not appeal, but asks that we affirm the dismissal.

We independently review the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12) and reverse the hearing judge.

The parties stipulated that Collins was served with all five sanctions motions and orders, that he was named in the sanctions orders along with his client, and that he was jointly and severally responsible for the debt. The superior court records indicated that the motions named only Collins’s client, while the resulting sanctions orders named Collins’s client and his counsel, the Law Offices of Joseph P. Collins. The hearing judge disregarded the stipulation and found that the orders were void or voidable as to Collins since he was not named in the motions or personally named in the sanctions orders.

We enforce the factual admissions in the parties’ stipulation, which demonstrate that Collins was aware of the sanctions orders, which he was subject to, and failed to comply or challenge them in the courts of record. We disagree with the hearing judge that the sanctions orders can be collaterally attacked for the first time in these proceedings. After considering and weighing aggravation and mitigation, we find no basis to deviate from the applicable disciplinary standard, which minimally calls for a period of actual suspension. We therefore recommend a 30-day actual suspension, which we note is at the lowest end of the standard’s range but is sufficient to protect the public, the courts, and the profession.

(Mike Frisch)