No Recusal Necessary

The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a decision of a District Attorney to voluntarily  recuse

In 2016, attorney Craig Colwart, a public defender in the 16th JDC, was hired as an assistant district attorney in the same district. His hiring precipitated recusal by the District Attorney and his entire office from 86 prosecutions in which Colwart was perceived to have a conflict. Among those recusals was from participating in a hearing to determine parole eligibility for Danny Battaglia. Codefendants Battaglia and Robert Thibodeaux had pleaded guilty to a murder they committed together as juveniles in 1981. Battaglia filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence seeking parole eligibility pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).

Colwart represented Thibodeaux in an earlier post-conviction proceeding and never represented Battaglia. Nonetheless, the District Attorney voluntarily moved to recuse himself and his office from further proceedings in Battaglia’s Miller hearing because Colwart “may have received information from [Thibodeaux] concerning [Battaglia’s] involvement in the murder of the victim in this case.” After the district court granted the motion to recuse, the Attorney General filed a motion to vacate that ruling. In response to this motion, the District Attorney reiterated, “a conflict exists in this case since [Colwart] probably learned the details of [Battaglia’s] participation in the murder from his discussion of the case with [Thibodeaux].”

The Attorney General appealed and the court held

After briefing and oral argument, it is apparent that the Attorney General and the District Attorney now agree on most of the issues. For example, the parties agree that, while Colwart should be recused from participating in Battaglia’s Miller hearing, any conflict Colwart may have is not imputed to the District Attorney or his other assistants. Nonetheless, the District Attorney maintains that the district court did not err in refusing to vacate the granting of the motion to recuse because participation in the Miller hearing by one of his other assistants would create an appearance of partiality that could erode public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings. We disagree.

… To resolve the present case, we find it unnecessary to examine further any interplay between these two articles or to consider the extent of the District Attorney’s discretion to recuse himself voluntarily. There is no support for the district court’s determination that public confidence in the proceedings is risked under the circumstances here in which a  former public defender, who had no involvement with Battaglia and whose conflict is speculative, is employed by the District Attorney but otherwise uninvolved in Battaglia’s Miller hearing. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s ruling granting the District Attorney’s motion to recuse and remand for further proceedings.

(Mike Frisch)