No Disbarment For Hair Dye Theft
A three-year suspension has been imposed by the Louisiana Supreme Court on an already-suspended attorney
In January 2015, respondent was arrested for shoplifting hair dye, which was valued at $7.29, from a Rouses Supermarket in Mandeville, Louisiana. Respondent was ultimately charged with misdemeanor theft of goods. In October 2015, respondent pleaded guilty to this charge as well as the 2011 shoplifting charge previously discussed.
When the ODC received notice of respondent’s 2015 arrest, it sent her three separate letters requesting she provide a written explanation of her conduct. Two of the letters were sent via certified mail, and one letter was sent via regular mail. Only one of the letters was returned, unclaimed. Respondent never filed a written response to the ODC’s letters.
Prior discipline
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 2006. In 2010, we suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of unsupervised probation with conditions. In re: LaMartina, 10-0093 (La. 7/2/10), 38 So. 3d 266 (“LaMartina I”). During the probationary period, however, respondent engaged in additional misconduct. She was arrested for shoplifting on October 5, 2011 (stemming from the theft of $166.87 in merchandise from a Target store in Covington, Louisiana) and she was twice arrested on civil attachments issued in two civil cases in which she was the defendant. For these violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we revoked respondent’s probation and immediately made executory the previously deferred one year and one day suspension imposed in LaMartina I.
Sanction here for the hair dye
Like the board, we found little guidance from this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct. However, the Ohio cases cited by the board are persuasive in suggesting that a suspension is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for three years.
Justice Crichton would disbar.
The Court has dismissed a matter involving allegations of unauthorized practice while suspended by the same attorney.
Chief Justice Johnson dissented
The underlying issue in this attorney discipline case is whether a suspended attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by representing two LLCs of which she is a member. The majority of this court simply dismisses the charges, finding the ODC has not proved that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law “in light of the ambiguity of La. R.S. 37:212(C).” La. R.S. 37:212, defining the practice of law, provides that “nothing in this Section shall prohibit any partnership, corporation, or other legal entity from asserting or defending any claim, not exceeding five thousand dollars, on its own behalf in the courts of limited jurisdiction or on its own behalf through a duly authorized partner, shareholder, officer, employee, or duly authorized agent or representative. No partnership, corporation, or other entity may assert any claim on behalf of another entity or any claim assigned to it.” La. R.S. 37:212(C) (emphasis added). The issue is whether this exception permitted the respondent to appear on behalf of the LLCs such that she did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law. In my view, rather than summarily dismissing the charges, this court should set this matter for oral argument and issue an opinion directly addressing whether Section (C) permits a nonlawyer to represent an LLC. In addition to making a determination of whether respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, an opinion by this court would also provide specific guidance for future conduct.
Justice Weimer also dissented (Mike Frisch)