Tarra Simmons Can Sit For The Washington State Bar

As a follow up to yesterday’s post on the Tarra Simmons oral argument, I am advised that the Washington State Supreme Court entered an order granting her permission to sit for the bar examination.

Congratulations to her and to her counsel Shon Hopwood. 

One thing that I will say having seen the argument is that the quality of Shon’s advocacy itself is a ringing endorsement of a policy allowing admission of rehabilitated convicted felons (although I confess bias in his favor).

I learned through my involvement in this case that the court has only issued two written opinions in admission cases, both many years ago.

The 1984 decision in In re Belsher is linked here and involved this applicant

On March 12, 1973, in Boulder, Colorado, petitioner placed a homemade bomb in his parents’ car. The bomb consisted of several sticks of dynamite and a timing device. The timing device was activated that same day, causing an explosion which demolished the Belshers’ car. Belsher’s mother and father, however, escaped injury by leaving the car a few seconds before the explosion.

Petitioner was arrested and admitted responsibility for the explosion. After a psychiatric examination by Dr. Charles Clark, petitioner was found to be competent to stand trial. On March 14, 1973, he was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of first degree arson. A joint motion for deferred prosecution with 2 years’ supervised probation on the condition that petitioner undergo continuing psychiatric treatment was granted on November 26, 1973. Dr. Clark was selected as the treating psychiatrist.

In March 1974, it was discovered that petitioner had been manufacturing an illegal drug ingredient (amphetamine precursor) in his chemistry lab at the University of Colorado. He advised Dr. Clark that he was doing so in order to become an undercover agent for the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service. About this same time, petitioner also attempted to purchase two pistols, using a friend’s name. As a result of these incidents, petitioner was charged with attempt to manufacture dangerous drugs, conspiracy to manufacture dangerous drugs, and criminal impersonation. In addition, petitioner’s deferred prosecution was revoked.

Pursuant to plea bargain arrangements, petitioner pleaded guilty on May 16, 1974 to three reduced charges: third degree assault, possession of a dangerous drug, and criminal simulation. All other charges, including those stemming from the bombing incident, were dismissed. Petitioner was placed on supervised probation to run until May 16, 1979. One of the conditions of the probation was that petitioner continue to see Dr. Clark.

The court was unpersuaded that the he had recovered from mental health issues.

Petitioner contends that his past misconduct, although serious, was the result of mental problems which have since been corrected. He points to the fact that 9 years have gone by since the termination of his treatment with Dr. Clark. Petitioner argues that this passage of time without serious mishap demonstrates that he has overcome the problems that plagued him in the past and that he is possessed of present good moral character.

Having previously engaged in serious misconduct, petitioner must “clearly demonstrate” that he is now worthy of the public trust that is placed in attorneys; if doubt remains, fairness to the public and the bar requires that admission be denied. See Eddleman, at 43.

In this case, there is doubt as to petitioner’s rehabilitation. Dr. Carney, who was the last to examine petitioner, expressed some doubt in his report as to petitioner’s complete recovery. Dr. Carney stated that such a recovery after an active episode of schizophrenia would be “highly unusual.” He further stated:

In my opinion Mr. Belsher shows very subtle signs that have to do with constricted emotions, emotional distance in the interview, curious lack of apparent remorse, and a poor understanding of the impact of his behavior on other people. Considering these observations, a case could be made for the diagnosis of Schizophrenia, residual type, in which there are no prominent psychotic symptoms but some indicators of the illness.

The possibility that petitioner’s apparent recovery is merely a temporary remission is a disturbing one. The uncertainty is compounded by the absence of any continuing record of petitioner’s progress regarding his ailment after 1975. This lack of any psychiatric evaluation of the manner in which petitioner has handled stress over the past 9 years makes it difficult, if not impossible, to predict how petitioner would handle the high degree of stress which is inherent in the practice of law.

I hope the court here will issue a thorough opinion here that addresses the relationship between the admissions apparatus and the court, the showing necessary to establish character and fitness in light of prior criminal conduct and the impact of recovery from addiction on the analysis.

Coverage of the broad issue from The Atlantic is linked here. (Mike Frisch)