Contingent Fee In Workers’ Comp Case Draws Bar Charges

The Illinois Administrator has charged an attorney with charging an unreasonable fee in a workers’ compensation matter involving a client who had four fingers amputated

…an employer must automatically pay any employee who was injured at its place of employment. The Act pre-determined the dollar-amount that an employer must compensate its worker, for each body part that was injured, permanently or temporarily, partially or fully. At the time of Hooker’s injury, the Act valued the permanent partial disability rate for 100% loss of use of a hand at $101,323.50.

Charter Steel never disputed liability for Hooker’s injury and never communicated to Respondent, or to Hooker, that the company was disputing liability. On January 12, 2015, Charter Steel, through its insurer, The Hartford, sent Hooker its check number 1234871238, which had been made payable to Hooker’s order in the amount of $101,323.50, the full amount Hooker was eligible to receive under the Act for the loss of the use of his hand. Hooker contacted Respondent when he received the check.

At the time that Respondent learned of the issuance of The Hartford’s check in the amount of $101,323.50, Respondent had performed no further substantial services for Hooker, other than filing the Application. Also as of that time, Charter Steel had not disputed liability, thus limiting Respondent’s attorney’s fee for her representation of Hooker in the workers’ compensation case, pursuant to the Act, to $100, and not to the 1/3 contingency fee that Respondent and Hooker had originally agreed to.

On January 23, 2015, Hooker met Respondent at MB Financial Bank, endorsed the check and tendered it to Respondent. Respondent then deposited the check in her client trust account at MB Financial Bank, which ended in the four digits 1293, and was entitled “Joan A. Hill-McClain, IOLTA Account.” Shortly after that bank visit, Respondent wire-transferred $81,323.50 to Hooker. Respondent retained the balance of the check proceeds, $20,000, as a purported payment of her attorney’s fees, and deposited it in to her personal account at MB Financial Bank, which ended in the four digits 1989, and was entitled “Joan A. Hill-McClain.” Respondent then drew funds from Hooker’s $20,000 in payment of her business or personal obligations.

At no time had Respondent obtained authorization from the Workers’ Compensation Commission to take $20,000 in attorney’s fees from Hooker’s check.

At no time had Respondent provided Hooker with a written statement showing how she determined to take $20,000 in attorney’s fees from Hooker’s check.

Also alleged

Throughout 2015 and 2016, while Respondent was representing Hooker for injuries resulting from the October 20, 2014 incident, Hooker was not working and, as a result, was not actively earning any wages or salary.

During this time, Hooker asked Respondent for additional money so that he could submit monthly rental payments on his apartment in Chicago, buy groceries and purchase clothing for his child. Respondent agreed to provide financial assistance to Hooker and gave him a total of $2,100, by way of three personal checks totaling $1,500 and an additional $600 in cash.

Respondent’s payments to Hooker were not court costs or expenses related to contemplated or pending litigation.

The matter came to light when the client retained new counsel. (Mike Frisch)