Reconsideration Of Sanction Denied
A former judge’s motion for reconsideration of sanctions has been denied by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
First, [the former judge] contends that the two-year suspension from the practice of law and $5,000 forfeiture that we ordered as sanctions for his numerous violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct violated his rights to equal protection and due process of law because, he argues, the sanctions were more severe than the sanctions recommended by the Committee—a $10,000 fine and a two-year suspension from the practice of law, with the suspension from practice to take effect only if Nadeau again sought election as a probate judge.
Second, Nadeau contends that the sanctions imposed on him may violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because, Nadeau alleges, many clients desirous of his services will be deprived of his services if the two-year suspension from the practice of law remains in effect. Nadeau further asserts that “[t]here has been no finding that [he] has engaged in any harm to any private client in his 36 years as an attorney, and no evidence that he would ever commit such harm in the future.”
As to issue one
Nadeau’s claim that he was not on notice about the possibility that his license to practice law would be suspended is undermined by our opinion in In re Cox, 658 A.2d 1056 (Me. 1995)—a case specifically addressed during the February oral argument. Cox, like Nadeau, was no longer a judge when we heard his judicial discipline action. Id. at 1057. Cox, like Nadeau, argued that the action was moot because no sanctions could be imposed for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct on a person who was no longer a judge. Id. As we pointed out to Nadeau at oral argument, we rejected Cox’s mootness argument, and, noting that Cox had “returned to the private practice of law,” id., we ordered that Cox be disbarred from the practice of law as the sanction for his violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, id. at 1058. Our decision in Cox placed Nadeau on notice that his license to practice law could be suspended, and that exposure was made even more clear by the colloquy at oral argument…
Nadeau’s analogy to criminal proceedings, where a State’s sentencing recommendation is sometimes a cap, is inapt because of the different nature of this proceeding. It must also be noted that the Committee’s sanction recommendation was made as part of its prosecution of its 2016 filing, Jud-16-1, before presentation of its additional report of improper personal solicitation of campaign contributions asserted in Jud-17-1 and addressed in our opinion.
As to the “no harm” contention
The sanctions we impose here rest on our consideration of all of Nadeau’s history of professional misconduct, as both an attorney and a judge. As we stated in the opinion that is the subject of this motion,
This is now the fourth time that Judge Nadeau has appeared before us for ethical violations, and the third time for conduct that occurred while serving in a judicial capacity. [Citing the 2016, 2007, and 2006 opinions referenced above.] Here, his actions were often carried out in an intemperate and vindictive fashion against former colleagues of his law practice and their associates. Attorneys’ reputations were harmed, and litigants before him were pressured to support his efforts to increase court resources and his compensation. Judge Nadeau has not fully acknowledged the intemperate nature of his decisions.
We have already acknowledged that “prior corrective efforts have not been effective in dissuading [Judge Nadeau] from engaging in intemperate conduct prohibited by the Canons.”
In re Nadeau, 2016 ME 116, ¶ 49, 144 A.3d 1161. This time, therefore, more severe sanctions are warranted. In re Nadeau, 2017 ME 121, ¶¶ 62-63, — A.3d —.
With this history, Nadeau was certainly on notice regarding the sanctions he could face; he has not been denied due process in this proceeding; and he has failed to demonstrate that he has been sanctioned more harshly than others similarly situated, having identified no Maine attorney with a history of professional misconduct violations as extensive as his own. Nadeau’s motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
(Mike Frisch)