Professor Loses Appeal On Denial Of Attorney’s Fees

The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to a tenured but incarcerated professor in a case described by the court

the case addressed the termination of Paul Frampton (“plaintiff”), a tenured professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC”), who was arrested in an airport in Buenos Aires, Argentina and ultimately convicted of smuggling cocaine found in his suitcase. Id. Following plaintiff’s arrest, UNC’s chancellor placed plaintiff on unpaid leave and terminated his salary and benefits without pursuing the disciplinary procedures outlined in the university’s tenure policies. After appealing to the UNC Board of Trustees, which upheld the decision to place plaintiff on leave without pay, plaintiff filed a petition for judicial review of a State agency decision in Orange County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed UNC’s actions, and plaintiff appealed to this Court. On appeal, this Court held that by placing plaintiff on personal, unpaid leave instead of pursuing formal disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the tenure policy, UNC violated its own policies. On this basis, this Court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the matter for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of the salary and benefits withheld that should have been paid to plaintiff.

The plaintiff was awarded damages but not fees

Upon remand, plaintiff filed a motion requesting compensation for unpaid salary and benefits as well as attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded plaintiff $231,475.92 in back salary and $31,824.53 for loss of benefits, but denied the motion for attorney’s fees.

On appeal

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in concluding UNC did not act without substantial justification. We disagree…

Plaintiff next argues the trial court erred in finding that there were special circumstances that would make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. We disagree. North Carolina case law is limited with regard to interpreting what qualifies as special circumstances that would make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. However, our courts have looked to federal decisions applying similar laws for guidance on interpreting statutory language…

In the order denying plaintiff attorney’s fees, the trial court based its conclusion that “it would be unjust to require the State to pay attorney’s fees” to plaintiff on “the record in this case, the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals [in Frampton I], the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant-statutory and case law.” Given the trial court’s reasoned response and plaintiff’s failure to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching its decision to deny the requested award, we overrule plaintiff’s argument.

The News & Observer covered the litigation. (Mike Frisch)