“It Can Be No Other Way”

The Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed a 15-month suspension on stipulated facts, rejecting the attorney’s argument that deference be accorded to the one-year suspension that the Office of Lawyer Regulation had agreed to.

Attorney Ruppelt was admitted to the practice of law in this state in May 1994. He currently practices law in Milwaukee. Attorney Ruppelt has been the subject of professional discipline on one previous occasion: in 2014, this court publicly reprimanded him for engaging in improper sexual relations with a client and providing false information to his employer and the OLR regarding the nature and timing of his relationship with the client.

In the instant case, Attorney Ruppelt’s actions fall into two broad categories of misconduct, both of which involve the same client, S.J. The first category of misconduct concerns Attorney Ruppelt’s conversion of $50,000 of trust account funds to his own use, though he later repaid that amount. The second category of misconduct generally concerns Attorney Ruppelt’s additional trust fund improprieties; his dishonest billing practices; his efforts to conceal his misconduct from opposing counsel, the circuit court, and the OLR; and his failure to reasonably consult with S.J.

As to the OLR’s position

We agree with the referee that the parties’ stipulated one-year suspension does not adequately take into account the duration and severity of
Attorney Ruppelt’s misconduct. We note in particular the referee’s observations that Attorney Ruppelt deliberately and repeatedly “ignore[d] all trust rules and used trust funds as though they were his own”; that he displayed a willingness to cover-up his misconduct and deceive those who inquired about it; that his liquidation of S.J.’s life insurance policy without S.J.’s knowledge or consent was “most disturbing”; and that he exhibited “a total lack of professionalism and the moral character required of a licensed attorney.” On these facts, which we deem justified by the record, our cases readily support the 15-month suspension called for by the referee. 

On deference

we will not adopt, through case law, a policy by which the court will defer to parties’ disciplinary stipulations, as Attorney Ruppelt requests. Due to our overarching duty to protect the public and the bar, we must remain the ultimate arbiter of the appropriate level of discipline, owing no deference on this subject to either the parties or the referee. To be sure, parties’ and referees’ opinions on disciplinary sanctions are highly informative, but they are just that——opinions, not authorities to which we must defer.

Neither do we agree with Attorney Ruppelt’s argument that a referee may not make any factual findings outside of the facts expressly included within the parties’ stipulation. As a factfinder, the referee may draw any reasonable inferences from the evidence introduced——here, the stipulated facts——just as a circuit court may do when operating as a factfinder…

It can be no other way.

The court remanded to consider restitution. (Mike Frisch)