No Misconduct Found In Unusual New Jersey Case
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with a dissent from the censure recommendation of its Disciplinary Review Board and dismissed ethics charges against an attorney for conduct in the wake of a friend’s suicide.
The court concluded that the record did not establish clear and convincing evidence of an ethics violation.
The DRB majority had found misconduct in the attorney’s entry into the friend’s condominium and various explanations of her behavior.
In light of these contradictions and inconsistencies, the [District Ethics Committee] determined that respondent had made false statements to disciplinary authorities. It noted that respondent attempted to excuse her conduct by alleging that she had “permission” to enter the condominium, given by the gatekeeper at the condominium complex, and by the manager of the business office as well as by Alma Dobbs, who had told her to “take care of things.” Respondent also made conflicting statements to explain her entry to Spence’s condominium with reference to her daughter’s key, when it appears that she entered the condominium using the key found in Spence’s unlocked car. The hearing panel found that these representations were intended to impede the investigation of Rabb’s grievance and, thus, constituted a violation of RPC 8.1(a).
…respondent’s actions must be branded as serious misconduct. In aggravation, respondent took contrary positions during the investigation, in her verified answer, and her statement attached to her verified answer. She persisted in her inconsistencies throughout the DEC hearing, which, in our view, demonstrated a lack of remorse on respondent’s part, as well as a refusal to accept responsibility for her conduct.
Additionally, respondent’s status as a public officer — a municipal court judge for the City of Orange, New Jersey — serves as further aggravation.
A dissent found no misconduct.
This disciplinary matter grows out of a tragedy and a personal dispute, unrelated in any way to respondent’s practice of law. On September 15, 2013, Bonita Spence hanged herself in her West Orange, New Jersey condominium, located within a gated community. Spence had been a close friend of respondent’s for over twenty five years and, for a substantial period, the two lived together in a romantic relationship. Although the romance had ended about five years before Spence’s death, they remained close and shared
a co-guardianship of respondent’s 14-year-old niece, L.S., whom respondent had adopted…
For the majority opinion to make sense, one must conclude that respondent set out to steal some relatively inexpensive belongings of her close friend and prior lover and that minor inconsistencies in her statements were part of a calculated, intentional scheme to defraud, a conclusion for which I see no clear and convincing evidence…
In short, this is no more than a family or personal dispute that in my opinion has been litigated inappropriately in an ethics forum because one of the disputants happens to be an attorney. I would dismiss this complaint in its entirety.
Another dissent disagreed with the censure proposed by the majority and would suspend for three months.
I accept without question that Spence’s death by suicide was a traumatic experience for respondent and that her grief may have clouded her judgment. However, I cannot ignore the reality that respondent was a judge of the Superior Court and is a municipal court judge for the City of Orange. Regardless that she has no history of discipline, throughout the disciplinary process she has demonstrated a lack of remorse and a refusal to accept responsibility for her conduct. Of utmost significance is that, despite being told by the police, after the death of Spence, that to gain access to Spence’s residence she would need to first contact the Surrogate’s office to gain permission, and would required to be accompanied by a representative of the sheriff’s office, respondent took it upon herself to enter Spence’s condominium unit.
My esteemed dissenting colleague’s understanding of the record is markedly different from mine. She seems to have concluded that, on the morning after Spence’s death, respondent went to the Surrogate’s Court to discuss administering the estate. However, I can find no evidence of this in the record and, frankly, the record evidence is exactly to the contrary.
(Mike Frisch)