Skip to content
A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Practice Pointer: Do Not Call Your Client “Hot Stuff”

The Missouri Supreme Court has disbarred an attorney for trust account violations and other misconduct, including

At the same time McMillin was misusing client trust accounts, he also failed to fulfill other substantial duties owed to several of his clients. Natalie Toney hired McMillin in February 2012 for representation in a domestic relations matter and paid him $3,000 in advanced fees. She was then unable to consistently communicate with him as he repeatedly either canceled scheduled meetings or refused to come out of his office to meet with her. Much of McMillin’s limited interaction with Toney consisted of text messages he sent late at night containing inappropriate comments referring to Toney as “hot stuff” and “baby.” McMillin admitted the majority of Toney’s complaint “was probably true as far as me putting her off and not doing whatever, setting meetings and canceling.” Toney eventually terminated McMillin and had to hire another attorney for an additional $3,000 to complete the matter. This Court concludes McMillin violated: (1) Rule 4-1.3 by failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Toney; (2) Rule 4-1.4(a) by failing to keep Toney reasonably informed about the status of her matter and failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (3) Rule 4-1.5(a) by charging a fee unreasonable in relation to the work he did for Toney.

Sanction

The presumptive discipline for McMillin’s gross misconduct is disbarment. “[I]n a rare but appropriate case a sanction other than disbarment may be appropriate for intentional misrepresentation where mental illness is shown to have played a role in the misconduct and other substantial mitigating factors are also present.” Id. at 567 (internal quotations omitted). This is no such case. Even accepting as true McMillin’s mitigation claim of a mental disorder, there are no other substantial mitigating factors and this Court cannot ignore the number of aggravating factors that effectively offset, if not overwhelm, any mitigation. The aggravating factors confirm “there is no reason to depart from the presumptive discipline of disbarment in this case.” Id. at 566. Therefore, this Court orders McMillin disbarred.