Unhappy Complainant Lacks Standing To Appeal Dismissal Of Bar Grievance
The New Hampshire Supreme Court dismissed a petition for writ of certiorari, holding that an unhappy complainant lacks standing to challenge dismissal of a bar grievance.
The petitioners, Sanjeev Lath and Barbara Belware, have petitioned for a writ of certiorari, see Sup. Ct. R. 11, challenging the decisions of the Office of General Counsel of the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) and the Complaint Screening Committee (CSC). The ADO had dismissed a grievance filed by the petitioners against Attorney John F. Bisson. Upon the petitioners’ request for reconsideration, the CSC affirmed the ADO’s decision. In their petition, the petitioners argue that the ADO and the CSC erred by declining to docket their grievance as a complaint, and that the CSC erred by failing to answer the questions raised in the petitioners’ request for reconsideration. The respondents—the ADO and Attorney Bisson—challenge the merits of the petitioners’ claims, and also assert that the petitioners lack standing to bring this petition. Because we conclude that the petitioners lack standing, we dismiss the petition.
The posture
…the record reflects the following facts. On December 30, 2015, the petitioners filed a grievance with the ADO. The petitioners’ grievance arises out of the annual meeting of the Oak Brook Condominium Owners’ Association, which took place in November 2015. The petitioners are unit owners at Oak Brook Condominium. Attorney Bisson represented the condominium association at the meeting. The petitioners allege that, during the meeting, Attorney Bisson violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by, among other things, recording the meeting without the petitioners’ knowledge or consent.
The ADO reviewed the factual allegations in the petitioners’ grievance, along with the exhibits that the petitioners provided. On January 15, 2016, the ADO’s assistant general counsel sent a three-page letter to the petitioners, in which he reviewed the allegations, assessed the claimed violations, and explained the reasoning that led to his conclusion that “a hearing panel would not likely find clear and convincing evidence that” Attorney Bisson violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Regarding the claim that Attorney Bisson made a recording without the petitioners’ knowledge or consent, he noted that one of the petitioners’ exhibits showed that, in fact, the meeting had not been recorded. Based upon the analysis of the petitioners’ allegations, the ADO declined to docket the petitioners’ grievance as a complaint.
A request for reconsideration was denied and the appeal followed.
…disciplinary proceedings are not treated as “lawsuits between parties litigant but rather are in the nature of an inquest or inquiry as to the conduct of the respondent [attorney].” Merski, 121 N.H. at 909 (quotation omitted). The grievant participates in the proceedings not to enforce his or her own rights, but to “supply evidence of the alleged attorney malfeasance.” Akinaka v. Disciplinary Board, 979 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Haw. 1999). This principle is reflected in the rules governing the attorney discipline system, which make clear that a grievant may not control the prosecution of a charge, see Sup. Ct. R. 37(18), and that the complainant is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding, Sup. Ct. R. 37A(I)(j).
Because attorney disciplinary proceedings are structured in this manner, no personal rights or remedies of the grievant are adjudicated in, or directly affected by, a disciplinary proceeding. The grievant neither receives a legally cognizable benefit when an attorney is disciplined, nor sustains a legally cognizable injury when the attorney is not disciplined. Rather, the benefit of attorney discipline is bestowed upon the public at large…
…in light of the nature and purposes of the attorney discipline system, we conclude that a grievant does not have a personal interest in the outcome of an attorney disciplinary proceeding that is sufficient to confer standing. In reaching this conclusion, we join the many courts that have likewise held that a grievant does not have standing to challenge the disciplinary authority’s disposition of a grievance.
(Mike Frisch)