Decision Of “Limited Precedential Value” Has Some Resonance
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reciprocally disbarred an attorney convicted of tax offenses and disbarred in New York.
Mr. Lifshitz pleaded guilty to one count of filing a false personal tax return in violation of N.Y. Tax Law § 1804 (b) and accordingly notified the New York Clerk of the Court of his resignation on November 20, 2008. Mr. Lifshitz was disbarred on October 1, 2009, effective nunc pro tunc to November 20, 2008, the date of his conviction.
He has now been reinstated in New York but had not reported his disbarment to D.C. as required by court rule.
New York was aware that he had failed to report but credited his explanation in granting him reinstatement.
The court here found no grave injustice in disbarment
Mr. Lifshitz argues that reciprocal discipline in his case would be a “grave injustice” because if he were disbarred, then he would have to wait until 2021—thirteen years after his initial disbarment in New York—to apply for reinstatement in the District of Columbia. We have previously held that when, as here, an attorney has never practiced, has no clients, and no intent to practice in the future in the District of Columbia, assertions of “grave injustice” regarding the reciprocal discipline doctrine are “largely meritless.” In re Fuchs, 905 A.2d 160, 164 (D.C. 2006) (“This argument is largely meritless as respondent argues grave injustice and then stipulates that he has never practiced in the District of Columbia, has no relationship with any counsel in the District of Columbia, has no clients or office in the District of Columbia and has no plans to practice law in the District of Columbia.”). Accordingly, the grave injustice exception does not apply in Mr. Lifshitz’s case, and thus, we impose reciprocal discipline.
The court imposed the sanction effective in 2009 notwithstanding the attorney’s failure to report the New York sanction
Similar to the respondent in In re Glasco, Mr. Lifshitz never practiced in the District of Columbia and thus his failure to report was not a calculated feat designed to illegally practice in the District. Indeed, as he indicates, in October 2009 he was administratively suspended from the practice of law due to his nonpayment of dues. Moreover, the New York Departmental Disciplinary Committee, which was aware of this disciplinary matter in the District of Columbia, concluded that Mr. Lifshitz “has demonstrated that he possesses the requisite character and general fitness to practice law.” That Committee stressed Mr. Lifshitz’s moral transformation and newfound goals to set up a pro bono practice.
He is thus immediately eligible to seek reinstatement in the District of Columbia.
In re Glasco (decided in 1999) was my case.
There the court granted nunc pro tunc treatment to a California disbarment that , like here, came to light in D.C. only when the attorney sought reinstatement in the court that had imposed the sanction.
The court quoted the Board on Professional Responsibility
While Bar Counsel is correct that sound policy reasons support encouraging attorneys to notify this jurisdiction of foreign sanctions, according retroactive effect to Respondent’s disbarment should not have a detrimental effect on this policy goal. Respondent was solely responsible for bringing his conviction and disbarment to Bar Counsel’s attention; although the notice was filed late, Respondent stated that he believed the notice had been provided earlier by the California State Bar, and he did not exploit the lack of notice by using his District of Columbia license to practice.
For these and the other unique circumstances presented by this case, it will have, as the Board noted, limited precedential value.
Limited but apparently the precedent still has some vitality.
I well remember the Glasco oral argument and, in particular, the close questioning from now-Senior Judge Inez Reid.
Judge Reid always came to oral argument superbly well-prepared and knowing exactly what questions needed answers.
A great judge. (Mike Frisch)