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Iowa Suspends For Sex With Divorce Client

An intimate relationship with a divorce client led to admitted ethics violations and a minimum 30 day suspension by the Iowa Supreme Court.

In May 2014, Jane Doe met with Waterman for legal advice. Doe is a business professional with an M.B.A. and is a C.P.A. Doe had recently separated from her husband and sought advice from Waterman regarding dissolution of her marriage. After their initial May consultation, Waterman did not hear from Doe again until September. At that time, Doe wanted a protective order because her husband had threatened violence. Waterman explained to Doe the procedure for obtaining a protective order, and the next month, he filed a dissolution petition on Doe’s behalf. The main contested issue in the dissolution case was custody of the couple’s young children.

Waterman and Doe continued to meet to discuss the case. The conversation during those meetings, according to Waterman, started to “diverge from professional topics.”

Waterman and Doe also began having lunch together and texting each other. Waterman recognized his relationship with Doe had moved beyond that of an attorney and a client. He told Doe he should withdraw from representing her and gave her the names of two lawyers. In November, while Doe was still in the process of obtaining new counsel, she and her husband participated in a mediation without counsel present. The mediation appeared to have resolved many of the parties’ issues, including child custody.

Based on the outcome of the mediation, Waterman drafted a stipulation of settlement on Doe’s behalf and sent it to the husband’s lawyer. Because Doe believed the mediation had been successful, she did not retain new counsel. Around this time, Waterman and Doe began a sexual relationship.

Meanwhile, Waterman did not hear back from the husband’s counsel for several weeks regarding the settlement. Eventually, the husband’s counsel informed Waterman that the husband had changed his mind on custody and would not sign the stipulation. Negotiations between the two attorneys followed. Waterman once more discussed with Doe the need to engage replacement counsel. Doe agreed she would meet with a potential new attorney upon her return from a family vacation over the holidays.

On January 12, 2015, the husband’s attorney emailed Waterman indicating that the husband would accept the prior deal. Again believing settlement was imminent, Doe did not retain the substitute attorney, and Waterman remained her attorney of record.

In mid-February, the husband’s attorney advised Waterman that the husband had yet again changed his mind. Waterman told Doe that he did not anticipate settlement and she must retain new counsel. Waterman filed a motion to withdraw on February 27, and Doe hired new counsel.

During February, Doe’s husband became aware of a relationship between Doe and Waterman. On March 3, the husband’s counsel sent Waterman an email, stating that he intended to conduct additional discovery relating to custody, including discovery on Waterman’s relationship with Doe. Waterman responded that he would be self-reporting an ethical violation to the Board. Waterman in fact filed a detailed self-reporting letter with the Board on March 12.

Following Waterman’s replacement as Doe’s counsel, Doe and her husband participated in a second mediation in April. A stipulation of settlement was filed shortly thereafter. This settlement was a “tweaked” version of the earlier document drafted by Waterman. Waterman’s relationship with Doe ended in June.

He then self-reported and stipulated to the misconduct

After considering the relevant facts of this case, the recommendation of the commission, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and our own precedents, we agree with the parties that a thirty-day suspension of Waterman’s law license is warranted. We do not adopt the commission’s recommendation that Waterman be required to remain in therapy for two years. We often decline to impose conditions like this, in part because we do not have a mechanism for supervising their performance.

(Mike Frisch)