A District of Columbia Hearing Committee has recommended disbarment of an attorney for misconduct in two matters.

Respondent’s misconduct was extremely serious. In the Kryakov matter, she and Mr. Brown engaged in a fraudulent scheme to unlawfully obtain title to the T Street Property and sell it. Respondent used the bulk of her share of the proceeds to pay off a personal credit card bill. FF 55. She appropriated Mr. Kryakov’s furniture and personal effects, used a false name when he contacted her to get the property back, admitted that the property belonged to him but demanded that he pay to have it removed from storage and she simultaneously consigned it to auction, misrepresenting to an auction house that she held clear title to the property. She made false representations to the Kenny Firm to cover up her misconduct, testified falsely under oath in the Maryland and District of Columbia civil proceedings, and provided false explanations to Disciplinary Counsel.

In the Dixon matter, Respondent’s misconduct, while not as serious, involved the mishandling of client funds. She failed to provide her client with a writing explaining the basis of her fee or the scope of the representation, and commingled an advance fee in her operating account, without her client’s consent.

Attitude

Respondent maintained during the first phase of the proceedings that she did not violate any rules, and she denied most of the underlying conduct. Her attitude toward the misconduct, specifically her denials that she engaged in any misconduct, was the subject of significant argument by counsel in this case. Respondent largely denied the misconduct. In so doing, she provided inconsistent and incredible statements which the Committee, detailed in its findings, found to be false. Respondent’s apologies to Messrs. Kryakov and Dixon during the hearing were insincere, in that she failed to accept responsibility for her wrongdoing. Tr. 958-59 (“I apologize to Mr. Kryakov. I apologize to [Mr.] Dixon; that anything they thought I did or if I did do anything wrong, I apologize for it.”) (emphasis added).

 As to mitigation

Respondent argues that she has established grounds for Kersey mitigation based on a diagnosis of “Major Depression, Severe, with psychotic features and Alcohol Use Disorder during the relevant time period of 2008 through 2012,” which substantially affected her misconduct, and from which she “is substantially rehabilitated based upon the success of her continuing medical treatment and dedication to sobriety.” R. Mitigation Brief at 3-4. Disciplinary Counsel argues that although the experts “agreed that Respondent was significantly disabled by alcoholism and psychotic thinking[,]” they disagreed on when the impairment began and whether her disabilities caused her ethical violations. BC Mitigation Br. at 1-2.

The Committee finds that Respondent is not entitled to Kersey mitigation because she failed to prove that her disability was a substantial cause of the misconduct in Count I, and she failed to prove that she is substantially rehabilitated from her disability.