A complaint filed by the Illinois Administrator alleges that an attorney failed to disclose that his client in an automobile dispute had died 

On June 23, 2015, Respondent emailed [client] Krystek to advise him that Respondent planned to file a lawsuit on his behalf against Fergus Nissan and NMAC to compel arbitration. Krystek emailed Respondent on June 30, 2015 and did not object to filing the lawsuit.

Krystek died on July 30, 2015. As of that date, Respondent had not yet filed any lawsuit against Fergus Nissan or NMAC.

Krystek’s death terminated Respondent’s employment with Krystek, ended their attorney-client relationship, and revoked any authority for Respondent to take action on Krystek’s behalf.

On August 5, 2015, Respondent filed a complaint on Krystek’s behalf against Fergus Nissan and NMAC (“Defendants”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking to compel arbitration and alleging that the Defendants had violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The case was docketed as Krystek v. Fergus Nissan, Inc. (d/b/a Martin Nissan, Inc.) and Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., Cook County case number 2015 CH 11758. Bruce Terlep of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP (the “Swanson firm”) represented NMAC, and Karr Eggert, LLP (the “Karr firm”) and Hardt, Stern & Kayne, P.C. (the “Hardt firm”) represented Fergus Nissan.

On or about September 3, 2015, Respondent learned that Krystek had died.

The complaint alleges that the attorney made two settlement offers and appeared for the client without disclosing the death.

The case was dismissed when the client failed to personally appear for a court proceeding. 

I’d call that an excused absence.

Then

On February 12, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the order granting Fergus Nissan’s motion to dismiss. When he filed the motion, Respondent knew that Krystek had died and that he was no longer authorized to pursue a claim on Krystek’s behalf against Fergus Nissan.

On February 19, 2016, Respondent appeared in court, purportedly on behalf of Krystek. At that hearing Respondent argued the motion for reconsideration, but the court denied the motion. At the court appearance, Respondent did not disclose to Defendants’ counsel or the court that Krystek had died in July and that Respondent had learned of his death on or about September 3, 2015.

On December 14, 2016, Respondent filed several motions including a motion to vacate the sanctions against him. In that motion, Respondent revealed for the first time to the court and to the Swanson firm that Krystek had been dead since July 29, 2015, and that Respondent knew that he was deceased since at least September 3, 2015.

It is thus alleged

After Krystek’s death, Respondent was not authorized to take action on Krystek’s behalf and no longer represented him. The actions that Respondent took on behalf of Krystek after learning of his death on or about September 3, 2015…were false because Respondent’s actions and statements constituted representations to the court and opposing counsel the he continued to be authorized by Krystek and that he was representing him.

At the time Respondent took the actions and made the statements alleged…Respondent knew that he could not appear in court on Krystek’s behalf nor could he make or accept settlement offers to Fergus Nissan or NMAC without Krystek’s authority, and he knew that his statements and conduct alleged…constituted false statements.