Yes And No To Reciprocal Discipline
The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to impose reciprocal discipline, concluding that an attorney’s non-practice related behavior did not prejudice the administration of justice.
The attorney is a man of the West
Haderlie was admitted to practice in North Dakota in 2012 and has been licensed since that time. He is also licensed in Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. Haderlie was arrested on October 19, 2014, and later plead guilty to misdemeanor violations of Wyoming Statutes § 31-5-233, driving or having control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or controlled substances and § 6-5-204(a), interference with a peace officer. The record reflects that on July 2, 2015, the Wyoming Supreme Court publicly censured Haderlie after he acknowledged his conduct violated Rule 8.4(b) and Rule 8.4(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.
Haderlie has no prior discipline in North Dakota, and no prior discipline in Colorado, Montana, or Utah before this matter. As a result of Haderlie’s conduct, Haderlie stipulated to reciprocal discipline in Colorado and Utah. The matter was dismissed by the Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel as a matter of law because the underlying convictions are not the type of conduct that normally give rise to discipline in Montana.
The court majority
Here, Haderlie’s conduct was not connected to either the representation of a client nor a judicial proceeding. Rather, his arrest and conviction stemmed from off-the-job alcohol consumption and a confrontation with law enforcement that occurred at his home. Under these circumstances, Haderlie’s criminal conduct does not fit the majority-view legal application and definition of “prejudicial to the administration of justice” so that professional discipline properly can be imposed
Chief Justice Vande Walle dissented
While it may be arguable that not all crimes are necessarily prejudicial to the administration of justice, I do not agree that only that conduct connected with judicial proceedings is encompassed by the rule. It seems imperious to conclude that only in the setting of a judicial proceeding can there be acts prejudicial to the administration of justice. Persons other than lawyers and judges are involved in the administration of justice, albeit in a different setting. Lawyers are required to take an oath of office prescribed by N.D.C.C. § 27-11-20 and § 4 of Article XI of the North Dakota Constitution to “faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law.” Peace officers also are required to take the same oath to “faithfully discharge the duties” of their office. N.D.C.C. § 44-01-05. Haderlie was convicted in Wyoming for interfering with a peace officer who was fulfilling the duties of the office to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. The disciplinary authorities in Wyoming determined Haderlie was subject to discipline under statutes and rules similar to those in North Dakota. We should do the same. The sorry spectacle of a licensed lawyer interfering with a peace officer acting in the line of duty is not only damaging to the image and reputation of the legal profession, it is, I submit, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Nor do I agree, as Haderlie appears to argue, that because heretofore no North Dakota lawyer has been disciplined for similar conduct that fact somehow immunizes him from reciprocal discipline. To my knowledge the issue has not been before this Court prior to this time. I believe it is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice for a lawyer to interfere with a peace officer acting in the line of duty and I would impose reciprocal discipline. But, if, as the majority concludes, our rules do not currently make this conduct subject to disciplinary action, they should be amended to do so.
(Mike Frisch)