The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that a statute

The question in this case is whether a mentally competent, terminally ill patient has a constitutional right to have a willing physician, consistent with accepted medical practices, prescribe a safe medication that the patient may self-administer for the purpose of peacefully ending the patient’s life. If we answer yes to the question, a willing physician may assist the patient and avoid criminal liability because Section 30-2-4 would be unconstitutional as applied to the physician. If we answer no to the question, the alternatives for the patient are to (1) endure the prolonged physical and  psychological consequences of a terminal medical condition that the patient finds intolerable; or (2) take his or her own life, possibly by violent or dangerous means.

 It is not easy to define who would qualify to be a terminally ill patient, or what  would be the criteria for assuring a patient is competent to make an end-of-life  decision, or what medical practices are acceptable to aid a patient in dying, or what  constitutes a safe medication. These concerns require robust debate in the legislative and the executive branches of government. Although the State does not have a  legitimate interest in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will imminently come to an end, the State does have a legitimate interest in providing positive protections to ensure that a terminally ill patient’s end-of-life decision is informed, independent, and procedurally safe. More specifically, the State has legitimate interests in (1) protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession; (2) protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from the risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations, including pressures associated with the substantial financial burden of end- of-life health care costs; and (3) protecting against voluntary or involuntary euthanasia because if physician aid in dying is a constitutional right, it must be made available to everyone, even when a duly appointed surrogate makes the decision, and even when the patient is unable to self-administer the life-ending medication. Therefore, we decline to hold that there is an absolute and fundamental constitutional right to a physician’s aid in dying and conclude that Section 30-2-4 is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Petitioners in this case.