“A Study In Ethical Contrasts”

A Rochester City Judge should be censured according to a report of the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct for ex parte communications with a colleague in her own personal injury case.

They were on a first name basis and worked in the same courthouse. She called chambers and was immediately put through

Upon reaching Judge Odorisi, respondent told him, in sum and substance, “I need to talk to you,” and he responded, “Well, it can’t be, it’s not about this, your case, is it?” Respondent replied, “Well, actually, it is.” Judge Odorisi immediately told respondent that he could not talk to her about her case.

Over Judge Odorisi’s repeated objections and his efforts to terminate the conversation, respondent communicated to Judge Odorisi that she was unhappy with her attorney, that she wanted to avoid publicity, that she wanted to have the case transferred out of Rochester, and that she wanted a conference at which she, the attorneys and the insurance adjuster would be present.

Ms. Ware, who had left her desk after transferring the call, was in Judge Odorisi’s office during the conversation. She heard Judge Odorisi tell the caller several times that they could not discuss the case. According to Ms. Ware, the phone call lasted approximately two to three minutes.

The judge testified that the call lasted for 12-15 seconds.

There was a second ex parte contact by letter.

The commission

On two occasions, respondent violated fundamental ethical principles by privately communicating with the Supreme Court Justice who was presiding over her pending lawsuit against her insurance company. First, in a telephone call to his chambers that she initiated, respondent asked the judge to schedule a conference in the matter and conveyed other concerns about her case. Several days later, after both Judge Odorisi and her lawyer had advised her that such communications were ethically impermissible, respondent ignored those warnings and sent the judge an ex parte letter that contained substantive information about her alleged injuries and medical treatment. By engaging in such conduct, respondent conveyed the appearance not only that she was seeking special consideration because of her judicial status, but that she was attempting to influence the judge handling her case through prohibited, unauthorized ex parte communications. Even absent a specific request for special consideration, such conduct is inimical to the role of a judge, who is required to observe the highest standards of conduct on and off the bench and is prohibited from asserting judicial influence to advance private interests.

Mr. Emery concurred

Judge Dixon is an individual who, through her faith, character, force of will and personality, got her education, became a lawyer and then a judge. She appears to have overcome numerous obstacles in her life to have attained her judicial position…

Judge Dixon got no more money than was offered and no one responded to her improper efforts. No ticket was fixed. No merchant gave her goods. No crime went unpunished or improperly imposed. No one, other than Judge Dixon, suffered the ignominy or injury of her lost bearings.

Judge Klonick would remove the judge from office.

While I recognize that in some instances judges who abused their judicial position have been censured or admonished, the aggravating factors noted above, in my view, make this case one of the most serious the Commission has ever encountered for this type of conduct. This is particularly so since in this case – unlike, for example, the assertion of judicial influence in traffic cases or in administrative matters with no adverse party – respondent’s abuse of her judicial position to advance her own interests would be detrimental to the opposing party who lacks access to special influence…

although respondent has conceded – as she must-that her conduct was wrong, genuine contrition is lacking, given her persistent efforts to rationalize and minimize her behavior.

Judge Ruderman joined the dissent.

The Commission’s press release describes the determination.

Commission Administrator Robert H. Tembeckjian made the following statement.

“No one should invoke the prestige of judicial office for private gain. While there is disagreement over the appropriate sanction in this case, there is no doubt that Judge Dixon’s misconduct was serious and warrants public discipline.

“This case is a study in ethical contrasts. Twice, Judge Dixon acted improperly and in the process put another judge at risk. Yet that other judge, J. Scott Odorisi, responded responsibly, tried to prevent a colleague from acting unethically and acted honorably throughout.”

(Mike Frisch)