Sampson Shorn

An attorney convicted of a federal offense was interim suspended pending final discipline by the New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department.

Respondent, who was a member of the New York State Senate, attempted to prevent an associate, who had been charged by the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) with bank fraud and wire fraud in connection with a mortgage fraud scheme, from cooperating with law enforcement authorities by, among other things attempting to obtain confidential, nonpublic information regarding the mortgage fraud case through a person who, at the time, was an administrative employee with the USAO; and directing the associate to withhold documentation from the government. In addition, respondent falsely stated to FBI agents that he had not previously seen a check register page reflecting a prior payment of funds from the associate to respondent, which, in fact, the associate had shown him; and had not directed a Senate staffer to contact the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance for the purpose of having the sales tax liability of a liquor store, in which respondent had an ownership interest, reduced, which he did.

As to suspension

Respondent argues that good cause exists to deny the Committee’s request for an interim suspension. Respondent, however, has not presented any compelling reason why this Court should not impose an interim suspension. Furthermore, with regard to respondent’s request to postpone a sanction hearing until after he is sentenced, under Judiciary Law § 90(4)(g), a sanction hearing cannot be initiated until a final judgment of conviction is entered, which will occur once respondent has been sentenced (Matter of Kramer, 69 AD3d at 141). Lastly, as a matter of course, this Court refers serious crime matters to a Hearing Panel of the Committee to hear and report.

Accordingly, the Committee’s petition should be granted. We deem the offenses of which respondent has been convicted a “serious crime” pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) and 22 NYCRR 603.12(b). Additionally, respondent should be suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately, and until such time as the disciplinary proceedings against respondent are concluded, and until further order of this Court. Finally, respondent is directed to, within 90 days of his sentencing or release from incarceration, whichever is applicable, show cause before a Hearing Panel designated by the Committee, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(g), why a final order of censure, suspension or disbarment should not be made.

(Mike Frisch)