Bill Of Particulars

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has granted rehearing and issued a corrected opinion in a disbarment matter  to correct its discussion of Bar Counsel’s purported failure to provide the attorney a bill of particulars.

Mr. Barber next argues that he received insufficient notice of the charges against him because the Specification was “nothing more than a ‘shotgun pleading’” that did not adequately explain which factual assertions were used to justify which rule violations. Mr. Barber’s claim, however, is not that a bill of particulars was erroneously denied—it is that his constitutional right to due process was violated. We find no merit to this contention. Even assuming that the Specification was in some way deficient, Bar Counsel, in its opposition to Mr. Barber’s motion to dismiss, identified the factual allegations in the Specification that supported the particular rule violations of which Mr. Barber claimed to be uncertain. Moreover, at the outset of the hearing, Bar Counsel briefly went through each charge and explained which facts in particular supported each charge. The Constitution requires nothing more .

The court’s revised opinion reflects its rejection of a host of other procedural claims such as

We are also not convinced by Mr. Barber’s argument that the Specification of Charges did not comply with the oath requirement of D.C. Code § 11-2503 (b) (2012 Repl.). Bar Counsel verified that “I do affirm that I verily believe the facts stated in the Specification of Charges to be true.” As the Board correctly noted, “This is the same oath, by the same person, that the Court of Appeals specifically approved in In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361, 365-67 (D.C. 1996).”

That same person has obviously been there for a long time.

As co-counsel in Morrell, I should know.  (Mike Frisch)