Rush To Courthouse May Result In Suspension
An Illinois Hearing Board has recommended a sixty-day suspension of an attorney who
filed a frivolous Rule 224 petition against the Boeing Company and Malaysia Airlines to ascertain the identity of other potential defendants. Although Respondent admitted filing the petition, she denied it was filed without a proper basis, and therefore, denied engaging in misconduct.
The ethics charges involved conduct that took place after the Flight 370 incident.
The attorney had filed the action in Illinois that was dismissed as frivolous by the trial court
[A] Supreme Court Rule 224 Petition permits discovery for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be liable for damages (emphasis supplied). If the identity of the persons or entities who may be liable is already known, then a Supreme Court Rule 224 petition is unavailable as a procedure for any relief. Once there is sufficient information to identify at least one potential defendant, then the correct procedure is to file an action at law for damages, and either the general discovery provisions contained in . . . Rule 201 et seq.[] and/or the provisions of 735 ILCS 5/2-402 can be utilized to determine more potential defendants, as well as establish actual responsibility for the injury to the petitioning party or parties (Roth v. St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, 241 Ill. App. 3d 407 [5th Dist., 1993]; Guertin v. Guertin, 204 Ill. App. 3d 527 [3rd Dist., 1990]).
It is eminently clear from the Petition and the facts alleged therein, that the Petitioner is clearly possessed of the identification of two entities who may be liable in damages, one being the Respondent, Boeing, and the other being the Respondent, Malaysia Airlines . . . .
Finally, the attorneys representing the Petitioner in the instant Petition, had previously filed similar Supreme Court Rule 224 petitions against respondents in [two other matters] regarding fatal airplane crashes. Both of those petitions were assigned to this Court and on each occasion, this Court entered memorandum opinions and orders dismissing those petitions as having been improperly brought. Despite those orders, the same law firm has proceeded, yet again, with the filing of the instant petition, knowing full well that there is no basis to do so. Should this law firm choose to do so, the Court will impose sanctions on its’ own motion.
The hearing board
We believe, based on the evidence presented, that Respondent’s motive in filing the Rule 224 petition in the Siregar matter was publicity, not a good faith belief that she had a legal basis to do so. Respondent desired to be the first to announce publicly that she had initiated legal proceedings with respect to the Flight 370 incident and intended to prove both Malaysia Airlines and Boeing were negligent. This is evidenced by Respondent’s press conferences that took place in Kuala Lumpur shortly after the petition was filed and the numerous articles regarding the Flight 370 incident and her firm’s representation with respect to the incident that were posted on her website. Moreover, by the time Judge Flanagan had dismissed the Rule 224 at issue, Respondent had already obtained the press coverage she sought, which helps explain why she did not feel it necessary to appeal Judge Flanagan’s order dismissing the petition.
We are also unconvinced by Respondent’s assertion that it was not feasible to file a lawsuit against Boeing and Malaysia Airlines and then utilize the general discovery procedures to ascertain the names of additional potentially liable parties. Respondent’s filing in the Siregar matter came within weeks of the Flight 370 incident. The statute of limitations had just begun to run, so Respondent had a significant amount of time to file the lawsuit and invoke the general discovery provisions as suggested by Judge Flanagan. Moreover, Respondent’s assertion that Boeing would be uncooperative through the ordinary course of discovery after the filing of a lawsuit was speculative and unsupported by concrete evidence.
We also considered Judge Maddux’s expert testimony and are still not persuaded, based on the unique facts of this case, that Respondent’s use of Rule 224 was appropriate. Although Judge Maddux was well informed regarding the general use of Rule 224 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, he recognized merely “scanning” the Rule 224 petition at issue here and was confused regarding the specifics of the present matter. There was also no indication that he had been informed of Judge Flanagan’s and the Appellate Court’s concerns that Respondent was abusing the intended purpose of Rule 224. Moreover, he ultimately declined to offer an opinion on the validity of Respondent’s Rule 224 petition and stated he would not question Judge Flanagan’s ruling.
In consideration of the foregoing reasons, we find Respondent violated Rule 3.1 by filing an improper Rule 224 petition in the Siregar matter. While we considered the Administrator’s additional argument that Respondent had no factual basis to assert within the Rule 224 petition that Flight 370 had crashed as the result of Boeing’s negligence and agree that very little was and is known regarding what caused the Flight 370 incident, we decline to make a finding regarding the merits of a negligence claim against Boeing given the sufficiency of our above findings.
On sanction
In consideration of legal precedent, the nature of Respondent’s misconduct, and the aggravating evidence, specifically her willingness to disregard the judicial process for her own gain, her prior discipline, and attitude with respect to the prior matter, we believe a suspension of sixty days is warranted. Moreover, we are confident this sanction is appropriate in light of the goals of the disciplinary system and will impress upon Respondent the need to conform her future conduct to the ethical standards of the legal profession. Accordingly, we recommend Respondent, Monica E. Ribbeck, be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days.
The Cook County Record reported on the charges and prior discipline. (Mike Frisch)